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INTRODUCTION
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of
Utah ("Commissioner") is the chief executive officer of the Utah
Department of Financial Institutions ("DFI").

(Utah Code Ann. §

7-1-202 (Supp. 1993).) Among the entities over which DFI has
jurisdiction are all banks, all savings and loans ("S&Ls"), all
industrial loan corporations ("ILCs"), and all credit unions
operating in the State of Utah.

(Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-501 (Supp.

1993). )
This jurisdiction is not absolute.

Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-502

(1988) limits the jurisdiction of DFI. Banks, S&Ls, and credit
unions can all be chartered (authorized to do business as a bank,
S&L, or credit union) either by a state or by a federal
regulatory agency.

The main limitation on DFI's jurisdiction is

with respect "to business activities not wholly regulated or
supervised by an agency or department of the United States . .
.," which primarily means DFI for the most part does not have
jurisdiction over federally-chartered depository institutions in
Utah, including federally-chartered credit unions.
Banks, S&Ls, and ILCs are corporations which are owned by
stockholders, just like other corporations.1

Their "customers"

are depositors or borrowers, and are generally referred to as

1

Some S&Ls are mutual associations that are technically
owned by all their depositors. Most such S&Ls, however, are now
regular stock corporations that are not owned by all their
depositors; in any event, S&Ls have never used the terminology of
their depositors being "members", or have spoken - t a new
customer as "joining" the S&L. S&Ls also have not had the same
tax advantages as credit unions, nor have they been restricted in
who could be a depositor, i.e., no "limited field of membership".

such.

Furthermore, these entities are all subject to federal and

state taxation on their profits.
Unlike these other entities, credit unions have some unique
restrictions, advantages, and terminology.

A credit union is a

non-profit corporation that is technically "owned" by its
depositors.

Its depositors are called "members," and the member

technically doesn't deposit funds in the credit union, but rather
purchases "shares," with each share being equivalent to $1.00.2
When a person becomes a new member of a credit union, that person
is said to have "joined" the credit union.
Credit unions are exempt from Federal and state taxation on
their profits.

(12 U.S.C. § 1768, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(14)(A), and

Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-34 (Supp. 1993).)

Credit unions are also

limited as to who can join a credit union.

Only those persons in

the credit union's "limited field of membership" can join the
credit union.
Originally, most credit union's limited fields of membership
were associational.
profession.

There was a common employer, or a common

For example, the field might be "all persons

employed by ZCMI," or "all pipefitters."

In 1981, Utah law for

the first time allowed credit unions chartered by Utah to include
geographical areas in their fields of membership.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 7-9-3(5) provided then (as it still does today):

2

A person can also purchase a fraction of a share for a
fraction of a dollar, e.g., a deposit of $8.39 purchases 8.39
shares in the credit union.
2

7-9-3• Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
•

*

•

*

*

(5) "Limited field of membership" means persons
belonging to a group or persons designated as eligible
for credit union membership who:
(a) have a similar interest, profession,
occupation, or formal association with an identifiable
purpose;
(b) reside within an identifiable
neighborhood, community, rural district, or county;
(c) are employed by a common employer;
(d) are employed within a defined business
district, industrial park or shopping center;
(e) are employed by the credit union; or
(f) are members of the immediate family of
persons within the above groups.
[Emphasis added.]
A credit union defines its field of membership in its
bylaws.

(Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-12(3) (1988).)

bylaws must be approved by the Commissioner.

Amendments to the
(Utah Code Ann. §

7-9-11 (2) (1988).)
On September 9, 1983, David A. Kwant, DFI's Supervisor of
Credit Unions, prepared a memorandum ("Kwant Memo") to Elaine B.
Weis, who at that time was Commissioner.

(A copy of the Kwant

Memo is attached hereto and included herein by reference as
Exhibit B. ) The Kwant Memo argued credit unions needed to be
allowed to grow if they were to survive. Mr. Kwant suggested
that credit unions be allowed to amend their bylaws to include
all person residing within a county, and that the bylaws be able
to name more than one county, e.g., all persons residing in Salt
Lake County, all persons residing in Davis County, etc.

(This

policy of allowing credit unions to include in their fields of
membership all persons residing in county A, and residing in
county B, etc., will be referred to throughout this brief as the

3

"multi-county field of membership policy.")

Of course, the

Commissioner would first have to approve any amendments to the
bylaws, so this would serve as a check on any misuse of this
provision.
On September 9, 1983, Commissioner Weis approved the Kwant
Memo, including the policy of allowing credit unions to have a
multi-county field of membership.

Commissioner Weis noted her

approval at the end pf the memo.
In 1993, twelve Utah State-chartered credit unions and three
Federally-chartered credit unions with their home offices in Utah
incorporated Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. ("CUSC").
The main purpose of CUSC is to open offices which would serve as
a "shared branch" for these credit unions, with the possibility
that other credit unions may later be permitted also to use these
offices as a "shared branch" for their credit unions. Members of
any credit union authorized to use the shared branch can walk
into the shared branch and obtain almost all of the same services
the member could obtain at the home office or separate branch of
the member's credit union.
Because the idea of a "shared branch" had never before been
introduced in Utah, G. Edward Leary, the present Commissioner
("Commissioner Leary") decided to hold a hearing on the CUSC
Application.

The Utah Bankers Association ("UBA") filed an

objection to the CUSC Application.

UBA also appeared at the

hearing and presented a case against granting the CUSC
Application.

UBA's main objection is that it believes the

Commissioner is incorrect in allowing credit unions to have
4

multi-county branching.

UBA believes a credit union may include

in its field of membership only all persons in any one named
county.

UBA also argued CUSC could not be approved because CUSC

is not a "branch," nor does it fit within the authorization for
credit unions under Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993).
On November 19, 1993, Commissioner Leary conditionally
granted the CUSC Application.

On December 17, 1993, UBA filed

its petition with this Court for a review of Commissioner Learyfs
order.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
UBA petitioned for review of an administrative order of the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions.

The order was entered as

a result of proceedings under the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et seq. (1989 & Supp. 1993)).
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this petition
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-14 and -16(1) (1989), and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a) (Supp. 1993).
ISSUES
1.

Did the Commissioner of Financial Institutions misapply

the law in approving the CUSC Application?
Standard of Review:

Correction of error.

Utah Code Ann. §

63-46b-16(4)(d) (Supp. 1993); Dep't of Admin. Services v. Pub.
Service Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983); Bevans v. Industrial
Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah 1989).
2.

Did the Commissioner of Financial Institutions have

adequate evidence and grounds to approve the CUSC Application?

5

Standard of Reviews

Abuse of discretion.

63-46b-16(4)(h) (Supp. 1993);

Utah Code Ann. §

Morton Internat'l. Inc. v. Utah

State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The determinative statutes are Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-1103(34), 7-1-208, 7-1-303, 7-1-501, 7-1-502, 7-1-706, 7-1-708, 79-3(5), 7-9-5(29), 7-9-6, 7-9-11, 7-9-12, 7-9-16, 7-9-34, 7-9-47,
and 7-16-2, all of which are included in Exhibit A to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

UBA has petitioned this Court to review

an order of the Commissioner granting the application of CUSC to
provide "shared branch" facilities in Utah.

UBA believes the

order is incorrect because (1) it will allow credit unions to
continue to have multi-county fields of membership, in
contravention of Utah law, and (2) the operations of CUSC which
were approved are not operations in which credit unions are
authorized to participate under Utah law.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Commissioner Leary used his

discretion to hold a hearing on the CUSC Application.

The

hearing was held under the procedures of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et sea. (1989 & Supp.
1993)).

CUSC and UBA were the only parties who participated in

the hearing, although any interested person was invited to
participate.

UBA opposed the CUSC Application.

called witnesses and presented other evidence.
filed memoranda supporting their positions.

6

CUSC and UBA
CUSC and UBA

The Hearing Officer

wrote a memorandum opinion, as well as findings, conclusions, and
a recommendation to the Commissioner that the CUSC Application be
conditionally approved.
C.

Disposition in the Utah Department of Financial

Institutions.

Commissioner Leary conditionally approved the CUSC

Application.
D.

Statement of Facts.
1.

17-19)

On or about March 18, 1993, CUSC was incorporated.

(R.

CUSC is owned by fifteen credit unions with their home

offices in Utah.

Twelve of the credit unions owning shares of

CUSC ("state-chartered credit unions") are chartered by the Utah
Department of Financial Institutions ("DFI"), while the other
three ("Federally-chartered credit unions") are chartered by the
National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA").
2.

(R. 39)

On or about June 25, 1993, CUSC filed "An Application to

Provide Service Center Services for Credit Unions in Utah" ("CUSC
Application") (R. 1-128) with the Utah Department of Financial
Institutions ("DFI") to allow:
1.

The operation of service centers for credit unions
as consumer funds transfer facilities; (sic) or
otherwise;

2.

Participation in regional or national networks for
performing financial transactions;

3.

The acceptance and processing of loan applications for
and on behalf of participating credit unions; and

4.

The conduct of services authorized for credit unions
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 7-9-5(29).

(R. 2) In layman's terms, the service center is a "shared
branch," i.e.f a member of any credit union authorized to use the

7

service center can go into the service center and receive the
same services that a member could receive at a branch office of
the member's own credit union.

0rf as explained in the CUSC

Application:
A service center offers participating credit
unions with (sic) virtually all credit union services.
Central to the service center is the ability to provide
credit union services ordinarily performed by a teller
at a credit union office. The following example of the
completion of a transaction at a service center is
illustrative of a service center's function.
A member of one of the credit unions authorized
to use the service center] enters the service center
and "swipes'* his membership card through a card reader
and enters a personal identification number (PIN). The
member's membership is confirmed and validated
electronically through an on-line communications link
between the service center and the credit union. The
member approaches the teller station and the teller's
screen provides the information regarding the member's
account(s). The member's transaction is completed. If
checks are deposited, a printer at the teller's station
places the credit union's endorsement and routing and
transit number on the check. If cash is withdrawn, the
cash is paid by the teller. With all transactions, the
member's balances at the credit union are immediately
updated at the credit union.
(R. 4-5)
3.

The CUSC Application was accepted as complete by DFI on

August 23, 1993.

(R. 129)

Pursuant to statute, Commissioner

Leary referred the CUSC Application to Orla Beth Peck, Supervisor
of Credit Unions at DFI, to "make a careful investigation of the
facts relevant or material to such application," and then to
"submit [her] finding and recommendations in writing to the
commissioner."

(Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-706 (1988).)
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4.

On August 24, 1993, Ms. Peck gave Commissioner Leary her

written findings and recommendation on the CUSC Application.

(R.

129-131) Ms. Peck stated:
I don't think there is any question that Credit
Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. can legally operate
as (sic) shared branch of all 15 credit unions
participating in the CUSO [credit union service
organization]. The question is whether it can operate
as a Consumer Funds Transfer Facility and thereby
legally accept transactions from members in behalf of
credit unions in other states under a network
arrangement.
With respect to the four requests in the CUSC Application (set
forth in paragraph 2 above), Ms. Peck recommended as follows:
[Recommendation on] Request #1. [in the CUSC
Application] I recommend that we approve the shared
branch as a branch of all 15 credit unions and allow it
to begin operations serving only the members of the 15
participating credit unions.
[Recommendation on] Request #2. I recommend we
postpone a decision until we have had more time to
study it.
[Recommendation on] Request #3. I recommend that
we approve the shared branch to accept and process loan
applications on behalf of the participating credit
unions.
[Recommendation on] Request #4. I recommend we
approve the shared branch to conduct services
authorized pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 7-9-5(29).
(R- 131)
5.

Because the concept of a shared branch had never before

been introduced in Utah, Commissioner Leary decided to hold
hearings on the CUSC Application.

Commissioner Leary appointed

Gary B. Doxey, newly-appointed Deputy Commissioner of Financial
Institutions of the State of Utah, as the hearing officer
("Hearing Officer").

(R. 132)

9

6.

On September 3, 1993, a "Notice of Hearing on

Application to Operate Service Centers" was mailed to all
interested parties, including representatives of the appellants
herein, the Utah Bankers Association ("UBA").

The notice set the

hearing for 9:00 a.nu on October 20, 1993, and informed all
persons that notices, written objections, and memoranda had to be
received by DFI no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 19, 1993.
(R.132-135)

Notice of the hearing was also published in The Salt

Lake Tribune and the Deseret News on September 8, 12 and 19,
1993.

(R. 137)
7.

On or about August 27, 1993, UBA filed an action styled

The Utah Bankers Association v. America First Credit Union, et
al., Case No. 930904939 CV (Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah) ("UBA v. AFCU"), in which
UBA sought declaratory and injunctive relief . Named as
defendants were the twelve State-chartered credit union owners of
CUSC, CUSC itself, G. Edward Leary, as Commissioner of Financial
Institutions, and five other State-chartered credit unions each
of which also allegedly includes a multi-county field of
membership.

UBA requested the Court to declare invalid DFI's

policy on multi-county fields of membership.

UBA argued that if

a credit union wants to include a geographic area in its "limited
field of membership," and wants that geographic area to be a
county, the credit union may select only one county in the State
for which the credit union may say, "all persons residing within
this county may belong to our credit union," e.g.f a credit union
could, in its bylaws, authorize any person residing in Salt Lake
10

County to become a member, but the credit union's bylaws could
not say "any person residing in Salt Lake County, Davis County,
Weber County," etc.

UBA asked the Court to declare this

interpretation to be outside the scope of the statute, to enjoin
the Commissioner from authorizing further multiple-county fields
of membership for credit unions, and to enjoin credit unions with
multiple-county fields of membership from continuing to operate
branches in all but one selected county.

UBA also asked the

Court to declare that the Commissioner must reject the CUSC
Application, and to enjoin CUSC and the defendant credit union
owners of CUSC from engaging in shared branching, insofar as the
shared branching would allow any of the defendant credit unions
to solicit memberships, accept or pay deposits, or make loans in
more than one Utah county in violation of the geographically
defined field of membership limitation as interpreted by UBA.
8.

On October 19, 1993, UBA timely filed with the Hearing

Officer "Comments of the Utah Bankers Association in Opposition
to the Application to Operate Service Centers" (R. 138-163) and a
"Notice of Protest by the Utah Bankers Association" (R. 164-166).
Among the reasons UBA gave for opposing and protesting the
hearing was that the Court proceedings in UBA v. AFCU would
supersede any determination of the Commissioner.
9.

(R. 140-141)

A one-day hearing was held on the CUSC Application on

October 20, 1993. At the outset of the hearing, the Hearing
Officer had all persons present identify themselves.
present was from or representing one of three groups:
credit unions; UBA; and DFI.

(R. 176-180)
11

Everyone
(a) the

10.

Anyone present was given the opportunity to make a

statement or present evidence at the hearing.
11.

(R. 180, 320)

During the course of the hearing, CUSC called and

examined witnesses and presented other evidence in support of the
CUSC Application.

(R. 180-312)

UBA presented its case in

opposition to the CUSC Application, calling its own witness and
cross examining witnesses called by CUSC.

(R. 312-330)

CUSC

presented an opening statement (R. 180-197), closing argument (R.
326-349), and a rebuttal to UBA's closing argument (R. 365-374).
UBA presented closing argument (R. 349-365).
12.

During the course of the hearing, the Hearing Officer

informed all parties that the question of whether a credit union
can include in its field of membership all persons living in more
than one county would not be an issue in the hearing.

The

Hearing Officer said this was based upon two factors:
a.

DFI's policy on multiple county branching had been in
effect and unchallenged for ten years; and

b.

The question on the Commissioner's interpretation of
multiple county branching was probably the chief issue
in UBA v. AFCU.

(R. 304, 312-314)
13.

Subsequent to the conclusion of the hearing, the

Hearing Officer allowed the record on the hearing to remain open
to receive memoranda from the participants in the hearing (R.
321-325).

CUSC submitted a "Hearing Memorandum and Memorandum of

Points and Authorities" (R. 385-398) and a "Reply Memorandum of
Applicant Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. (R. 424-431)
UBA filed a "Supplemental Memorandum of the Utah Bankers
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Association" (R. 399-414) and a "Reply of Utah Bankers Assoc, to
Hearing Memorandum and Memorandum of Points and Authorities of
Applicant" (R. 415-423)
14.

On or about November 18, 1993, the Hearing Officer

filed with the Commissioner his "Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendations" ("Doxey Recommendations") (R. 447-56), and his
"Memorandum Opinion" ("Doxey Memorandum").

(R. 433-46) The

Doxey Recommendations explicitly incorporated the Doxey
Memorandum.

(R. 447 and 433) (A copy of the Doxey

Recommendations and a copy of the Doxey Memorandum are attached
hereto and incorporated herein be reference as Exhibits C and D,
respectively.)
15.

On or about November 19, 1993, Commissioner Leary

issued his "Findings, Conclusions and Order Conditionally
Approving" the application of CUSC ("Leary Order").

(R. 457-62)

Explicitly incorporated into the Leary Order (R. 457) were the
Doxey Recommendations and the Doxey Memorandum.

(A copy of the

Leary Order is attached hereto and incorporated herein be
reference as Exhibits E.) The Leary Order approved the
application of CUSC under the authority given to the Commissioner
in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-303 (1988) (R. 460), which in relevant
part provides:
Utah Code Ann. S 7-1-303 (1988)
The [Commissioner [of Financial Institutions] may
authorize institutions subject to the jurisdiction of
the department to engage in such joint and cooperative
actions as the [Commissioner finds will be in the
public interest, such as, but not limited to:
* * * * *

(2) joint use of facilities;
* * * * *
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The Commissioner also found that he had no jurisdiction to deny
the federal credit union owners of CUSC the right to use CUSC as
a shared branch facility, and that the regulator of those three
federal credit unionsf the National Credit Union Administration,
has specifically authorized credit union service organizations to
offer shared branching facilities which federal credit unions may
use,

(R. 461, para. 24)
16.

On or about December 17, 1993, UBA filed with the

Commissioner a "Petition for Stay of Order Conditionally
Approving Application."

(R. 464-473)

By agreement, CUSC was

given the opportunity to respond to UBA's petition for a stay,
and UBA was given the opportunity to reply to CUSC's response.
(R. 473A)

CUSC filed "Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc.

Response to the Utah Bankers Association Petition for Stay of
Order Conditionally Approving Application" on January 10, 1994
(R. 474-485), together with three supporting affidavits (R. 486499).

UBA then filed its "Reply of Utah Bankers Association in

Support of Petition for Stay" on January 24, 1994.

(R. 500-507)

On January 26, 1994, Commissioner Leary entered his "Order
Denying Petition for Stay."
17.

(R. 508-509)

On or about December 17, 1993, UBA filed with this

Court its "Petition for Appellate Review" of the Leary Order.
RELATED CASE
As noted above in paragraph 7, on August 27, 1993, UBA filed
its action in UBA v. AFCU.

Commissioner Leary filed a motion to

dismiss, with supporting memoranda.

All other defendants ("CU

Defendants") were represented by the same counsel, and the CU
14

Defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss and supporting
memoranda.

UBA filed memoranda in opposition to the defendants'

motions to dismiss, and filed its own motion for summary
judgment, to which Commissioner Leary and the other defendants
filed separate memoranda in opposition.

Oral argument was heard

on all motions on November 22, 1993.
On March 17, 1993, the Third Judicial District Court entered
its "Memorandum Decision and Order."

The Court granted the

motions to dismiss of Commissioner Leary and the other defendants
on the grounds UBA had no standing to bring the lawsuit.

In

addition, the Court ruled that except with respect to UBA's
claims for injunctive relief against CUSC, UBA's suit was barred
by the doctrine of laches and estoppel.
A final Order was entered by the Court on April 7, 1994. As
of the date of the filing of this brief, UBA has not appealed
that Order.

(A copy of the Court's "Memorandum Decision and

Order" and the "Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment and Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint" are attached
hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit F.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UBA petitions this Court to reverse an administrative order
of DFI granting an application of CUSC to offer a shared
branching facility which members of CUSC's credit union owners
can use in the same manner as those members could use a branch of
their own individual credit unions.
reversal:

UBA asserts two grounds for

(1) CUSC will further the violation of the prohibited

multi-county field of membership policy of DFI; and (2) a shared
15

branch facility is not an activity the Commissioner has authority
to grant to a credit union service organization like CUSC under
Utah Code Ann- § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993).
The Leary Order was lawfully granted under Utah Code Ann. §
7-1-303 (1988)-

CUSC meets the definition of a "service

corporation,"3 which means it is under the jurisdiction of DFI.
While a "shared branch" is not specifically mentioned as one of
the activities in whdch the Commissioner can authorize financial
institutions under DFI's jurisdiction to participate, the
language is that statute is broad enough to permit such an
activity.
At the hearing on the CUSC Application, sufficient evidence
was presented to allow the Commissioner to conclude that approval
of the CUSC Application was in the best interest of the public.
Therefore, the Commissioner could, and did, approve the CUSC
Application.

The Commissioner did not approve the CUSC

Application under Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993).
As for the multi-county field of membership issue, "field of
membership" is a consideration when looking at credit unions
themselves.

"Field of membership" —

and consequently DFI's

policy on multi-county fields of membership —

does not apply to

credit union service organizations or to credit union branches.
Assuming, arguendo, that the multi-county field of
membership policy did apply to the CUSC Application, the
Commissioner could still have granted the CUSC Application.

3

Title 7, Utah Code Ann. uses the terms "service
corporation" and "service organization" interchangeably.
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Most

of the credit union owners of CUSC have their home offices in
Salt Lake County, which is the only county in which CUSC has even
discussed offering a shared branch facility.

Those credit unions

could have applied to open branches at the CUSC location, and
unless opening such a branch would make a credit union
financially unsound, the Commissioner would had to have approved
the branch.
With respect to the multi-county field of membership issue,
the Commissioner's interpretation is correct.
language which supports this interpretation.

There is statutory
In addition, the

Commissioner and the Supervisor of Credit Unions are charged with
administering the law in this area.

Their long-standing policy

should be given deference by the Court, since this is a mixed
question of law and fact.

Also, the Court in UBA v. AFCU has in

effect "blessed" this interpretation, since it dismissed UBA's
suit in part on laches, and in part on standing, stating even if
UBA had added a named bank as a plaintiff, it would not have
overcome their problem on lack of standing.
UBA already tried to have its interpretation of the multicounty field of membership issue approved by the Court in UBA v.
AFCU.

UBA chose their forum, and they lost.

The should either

appeal that decision or else forget that claim; they should not
be given a "second bite at the apple" by appealing the Leary
Order to this Court.

At the very least, this Court should

determine, as did the Court in UBA v. AFCU, that UBA both lacks
standing to pursue this issue, and is barred by the doctrines of
laches and estoppel form pursuing it in this appeal.
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Finally, if UBA lacked standing to pursue its suit in UBA v.
AFCU, it lacks standing to appeal the Leary Order.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSIONER HAD THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE THE CUSC
Application,

A.

The Leary Order was Lawfully Granted Under the Provisions of
Utah Code Ann. S 7-1-303 (1988K
The Doxey Memorandum, the Doxey Recommendations, and the

Leary Order all went to great lengths to make it clear the CUSC
Application was being approved under the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 7-1-303 (1988).

CUSC was not approved under Utah Code

Ann. § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993).

Nor was CUSC approved as either a

"branch" under Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-709 (Supp. 1993), or as an
automatic teller machine ("ATM") or point of sale ("POS")
terminal under Chapter 16 of Title 7, Utah Code Ann. (1988 and
Supp. 1993).
1.

The Statutory Definitions for Approving the CUSC
Application under Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-303 (1988) Were
Met.

Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-303 (1988) in relevant part provides:
The [C]ommissioner may authorize institutions
subject to the jurisdiction of the [D]epartment [of
Financial Institutions] to engage in such joint and
cooperative actions as the [Commissioner finds will be
in the public interest, such as, but not limited to:
(1) mutual exchange of financial information as to
depositors, borrowers, and other customers;
(2) joint use of facilities;
(3) joint operation of clearing houses and other
facilities for payment of checks, drafts, or other
instruments drawn on or issued by various classes of
depository institutions;
(4) joint participation in lending programs to
promote the public welfare;
(5) joint risk management services; and
(6) joint ownership, operation, or furnishing of
electronic funds transfer services.
[Emphasis added.]
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The first question the Commissioner had to address was
whether the CUSC Application could be authorized under this
statute.

The evidence showed approval of the CUSC Application

would clearly allow credit unions to engage in "joint and
cooperative actions," but there was a question as to whether CUSC
is "subject to the jurisdiction" of DFI. As the Hearing Officer
found, Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-501 (Supp. 1993) provides in relevant
part:
The following persons and institutions are subject to
the jurisdiction of the department and are subject to
supervision and examination by the department as provided in
this title and the rules and regulations of the department:
* * * * *

(3) all service corporations;
(4) all credit unions;
* * * * *

"Service corporation" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1103(33) Supp. 1993) as follows:
(33) "Service corporation" means a corporation or other
business entity owned or controlled by one or more
financial institutions which is engaged or proposes to
engage in business activities related to the business
of financial institutions.
As the evidence at the hearing showed, CUSC is a corporation
"owned or controlled by one or more financial institutions," and
CUSC will be "engaged or proposes to engage in business
activities related to the business of financial institutions."
CUSC thus fits the definition of a "service corporation," and
"all service corporations" are subject to the jurisdiction of DFI
under Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-501(3) (Supp. 1993).

(R. 440-441)

The Hearing Officer determined a "shared branch" facility
would provide credit unions with "joint and cooperative actions"
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and a "joint use of facilities.-

He also determined that

although Utah Code Ann- § 7-1-303 (1988) does not specifically
mention "shared branch" facilities as one of the activities in
which the Commissioner may authorize financial institutions to
engage, the expansive language of the activities named in the
statute, and the words "but not limited to" prefacing the
specific of "joint use of facilities," gave further verification
to the authority of "the Commissioner to authorize a "shared
branch" facility under this statute.
Therefore, CUSC fit the definition of an institution subject
to the jurisdiction of DFI, and approval of its application would
authorize credit unions to engage in joint and cooperative
actions, including, but not necessarily limited to, joint use of
facilities.

As the definitional requirements were met, it was

within the Commissioner's discretion to approve the CUSC
Application if there were enough evidence to justify approval.
2.

The Commissioner Did Not Have to Rule on the CUSC
Application under Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-5(29 ^ (Supp.
1993), Nor Rule on CUSC as a Branch or as a Consumer
Funds Transfer Facility.

Although though the CUSC Application originally requested
that it be authorized to engage in certain activities under Utah
Code Ann. § 7-9-5(29) (Supp,. 1993), neither the Leary Order, nor
the Doxey Recommendations, nor the Doxey Memorandum even discuss
that section, which allows a credit union to:
(29) participate in systems which allow the
transfer, withdrawal, or deposit of funds of credit
unions or credit union members by automated or
electronic means and hold membership in entities
established to promote and effectuate these systems, if
the participation is not inconsistent with the law and
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rules of the department, and if any credit union
participating in any system notifies the department as
provided by law;
[Empha sis added.]
The Leary Order, the Doxey Recommendations, and the Doxey
Memorandum do not indicate why they did not analyze the CUSC
Application under Utah Code Ann, § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993);
perhaps the Hearing Officer and the Commissioner saw some of the
same problems raised by UBA in its brief (UBA Br. at 19-22).
However, there is nothing that prevents the Commissioner from
approving an application under a general provision that applies
to all financial institutions under DFI's jurisdiction just
because he could not grant that same application under a statute
that applies only to that specific type of financial institution.
Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-5(29) (Supp. 1993) does not say the
activities listed thereunder are the only activities dealing with
"by automated or electronic means" in which a credit union may
participate, and there is no reason to assume any such
limitations.
In the Doxey Memorandum, the Hearing Officer discussed the
nature of CUSC.

This was necessary because the idea of a shared

branch facility is a new concept in Utah.

This is the very

reason the Commissioner ordered a hearing on the CUSC
Application, rather than ruling on the application without the
benefit of receiving information in a hearing.
raised the question of the nature of CUSC.
Officer and counsel for DFI at the hearing.
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UBA legitimately

So did the Hearing
Counsel and

witnesses for CUSC freely discussed the nature of CUSC in the
hearing.
In the end, the Hearing Officer concluded CUSC was not a new
class of financial institution, although even that possibility
was considered by the Hearing Officer and explored in the
hearing.

The Hearing Officer also concluded CUSC was not an ATM

or a POS terminal, since by definition and ATM and a POS terminal
are not "branches."

Instead, he found CUSC was much more like a

modern branch of a financial institution, which has electronic
devices at teller stations, loan officers' desks, and elsewhere,
which electronic devices give virtually all officers and
employees of the financial institution in that branch immediate
information on the customer's accounts, and allow tellers to
accept deposits, allow withdrawals, accept payments on loans,
accept loan applications, and perform all the functions a
customer of one of the credit union owners of CUSC will be able
to do at CUSC.

(R. 433-446)

Yet CUSC itself is NOT a branch!

All the CUSC Application

requested was approval of the concept, and that is all the
Commissioner approved, and even then, the approval was
conditional.

Approval of the CUSC Application did not

immediately allow anyone to make deposits, or withdrawals, or
perform any of the other functions it was authorized to perform,
because none of the credit union owners had been granted
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authority to open branches at the CUSC site!* Only after a
branch application had been granted to a credit union could a
member of that credit union begin using the facilities of that
member's credit union's branch at the CUSC site.5
B.

The Evidence Supports the Approval of the CUSC Application
by the Commissioner.
During the hearing, CUSC presented evidence showing approval

of the CUSC Application to provide a shared branching facility
would benefit "the public."

Representatives of three credit

unions with ownership interest in CUSC, plus the President of the
Credit Union League of Utah (the state trade association of
credit unions in Utah), plus a representative of a credit union
that is not an owner of, and will not be participating in, the
shared branching facility, all gave oral testimony that the
shared branching facility would benefit the public.

(R. 197-272,

306-308)
The Hearing Officer also found the "CUSC presented evidence
at the hearing to support the feasibility, public benefit, and

A

On February 2, 1994, Mountain America Credit Union filed
a application for a branch at the CUSC site, and on February 16,
the other eleven State-chartered credit union owners of CUSC each
filed a separate application for a branch at the CUSC site. On
March 10, 1994, Commissioner Leary entered separate "Findings,
Conclusions and Order Approving Application" for branches at the
CUSC site for all twelve credit unions.
5

CUSC has not actually yet opened at its first site. It
is not expected it will have moved into its selected site and
have all the equipment up an running to serve all of its credit
union owners for some time. Thus, even after the Commissioner
granted the applications of twelve of CUSC's credit union owners,
the customers of those credit unions could not use — and
currently still cannot use — the branch facilities at the CUSC
site, but there is no legal barrier to their doing so, i.e., they
could do so if the CUSC site were up and running.
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the safety and soundness of its planned operation of service
centers," and listed seventeen specific findings to bolster that
general finding.

(R. 450-453)

For his part, Commissioner Leary

not only adopted the Doxey Recommendations, but also ruled:
25. CUSC has presented uncontroverted evidence
that participation in service centers will enhance the
convenience and availability of credit union services
to credit union members. The reduction of costs
through a cost sharing mechanism enhances the return to
credit union members and warrants an opportunity to
develop this concept of service delivery for Utah
credit union members. The risks inherent in providing
any new method of delivering services are present, but
is mitigated by the phased, step-by-step approach of
CUSC. In keeping with Utah's desire to be on the
forefront of technology utilization, service centers
present an undeniable opportunity for all financial
institutions. Credit union service centers are in the
best interest of the public.
[Emphasis added.]
(R. 461)
Given that CUSC and the services it proposed to provide fit
within the definitions of Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-303 (1988) by
which the Commissioner could grant the CUSC Application, and
given the evidence presented at the hearing that approving the
CUSC Application would be in the public interest, the
Commissioner properly and lawfully exercised his discretion when
he approved the CUSC Application.
II.

THE APPROVAL OF THE CUSC Application IS NOT UNLAWFUL BECAUSE
CREDIT UNIONS HAVE MULTI-COUNTY FIELDS OF MEMBERSHIP
UBA argues the Commissioner could not lawfully approve the

CUSC Application because CUSC will provide a branch for some of
CUSC's credit union owners which have multi-county fields of
membership.

UBA's argument can be summarized as follows: Utah

Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) allows a field of membership to include all
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persons residing within a county, not counties.

Many of the

credit union owners of CUSC have provisions in their bylaws
allowing for multi-county fields of membership.

The shared

branching facility of CUSC would allow these credit unions to
continue their unlawful practice by giving them another outlet in
a multi-county from which to solicit and serve members.

In light

of this, the Commissioner cannot approve the CUSC Application.
UBA's analysis is incorrect, because DFI's policy on multicounty fields of membership is correct.

Furthermore, the policy

is inapplicable to the Commissioner's consideration of the CUSC
Application, as explained in the points below.
A.

The Allegations of UBA with Respect to Multi-County Fields
of Membership for the Credit Union Owners of CUSC Are
Irrelevant to the Approval of CUSC.
As noted above, at the beginning of the hearing on the CUSC

Application, the Hearing Officer announced the question of multicounty fields of membership would not be an issue in the hearing.
The Hearing Officer explained DFI had had a long-standing policy
in place on that matter, which policy had not been challenged
during the ten years it had been in existence.

In addition, all

were aware of the lawsuit UBA had brought in UBA v AFCU, which
was pending in the Third Judicial District Court. (R. 304)

The

Hearing Officer made similar findings in the Doxey Memorandum and
the Doxey Recommendations.

(R. 445 and 455)

The Commissioner so

found by adopting into the Leary Order the Doxey Memorandum and
the Doxey Recommendations, and also through a separate finding.
(R. 460)
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However, UBA's challenge to DFIfs policy on multi-county
fields of membership is irrelevant to the CUSC Application
anyway.
1.

Field of Membership Relates to Membership in a Credit
Union, and not to Credit Union Service Organizations.

CUSC is not a credit union, but is rather a credit union
service corporation.

Therefore, if UBA's argument regarding

multi-county fields of membership has any efficacy, it is with
respect to the individual credit unions, rather than with CUSC
and the CUSC Application.

As noted above, the approval of the

CUSC Application did not create any new branches for any credit
unions.
2.

Field of Membership Relates to Membership in a Credit
Union, and not to Branches of a Credit Union.

UBA's own language in its brief shows the irrelevancy of the
field of membership argument with respect to branching.

UBA

states:
A credit union with the most expansive, one county
field of membership, for example, the residents of
Davis County, could certainly have branch offices
throughout Davis County. And it may be appropriate for
that credit union to have a branch in downtown Salt
Lake City to provide services for Davis County
residents who work in Salt Lake City. However, it
would be improper for the credit union to claim a
branch office in Utah County given the remote
relationship between that county and the Davis County
field of membership.
(UBA Br. at 14-15. )
Thus, UBA admits the credit union in its example could place
a branch in another county to serve its members.

UBA then

asserts this credit union could not establish a branch in Utah
County.

However, UBA gives no authority as to why the credit
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union in this example could branch into Salt Lake County, but
could not branch into Utah County.

The law, in fact, refutes

this position.
The branch application statute in Utah —
equally to credit unions and banks —

which applies

provides as follows:

7-1-708* Branches - Application and procedure for
approval.
(1) Except for classes of financial institutions
the commissioner may designate by rule, any Utah
depository institution or foreign depository
institution authorized to do business in this state may
establish one or more branches, subject to the prior
approval of the commissioner.
(2) Approval of the commissioner may be obtained
by filing an application with the commissioner in the
form the commissioner prescribes. The application shall
state:
(a) the proposed location of the branch;
(b) the date on which the applicant expects
the branch to begin operations;
(c) the estimated annual expense to operate
it; and
(d) any other information required by the
department to enable it to assess the applicant's
ability to open and operate the branch.
(3) The commissioner shall approve or disapprove
the application within 30 days after it is accepted as
complete. If the commissioner does not approve or
disapprove an application within 30 days after it is
accepted as complete, it is considered approved.
* * * * *

Under this statute, the Commissioner can really only reject
a branch application if he determines the granting of a branch
might cause the financial institution to be in an unsound
financial condition.

If the financial institution can show the

branch will not put the financial institution into an unsound
financial condition, the Commissioner is virtually required to
approve the branch.

Even if the financial institution expects

the branch will not lose money, the Commissioner will likely
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approve the branch, so long as the financial condition of the
financial institution itself will not be impaired by the
Commissioner's approving the new branch.

Therefore, if the

credit union in UBA's example could show that a branch in Utah
County would not put the credit union into an unsafe financial
condition, the Commissioner would have to approve the branch,
even if the credit union didn't have many —

or any — members/

depositors in Utah County.
If a credit union owner of CUSC can show the establishment
of the branch at the CUSC site will not cause the credit union to
become unsound financially, the Commissioner can, and will, grant
the application, whether CUSC is operating at that location or
not.

By the same token, if the credit union applied for a branch

at the CUSC site, or elsewhere, and the establishment of that
branch would cause the credit union to be in an unsound financial
condition, the Commissioner would deny that application.
After the Commissioner approved the CUSC Application, the
twelve state-chartered credit union owners of CUSC applied
separately for branches at the CUSC site.

Evaluating each

application separately, and evaluating each application for a
branch at the CUSC site just as he would an application at any
other site, in or out of Salt Lake County, the Commissioner
separately approved each application.

Field of membership simply

does not enter into the branch application process for credit
unions, just as location of current depositors of a bank is
irrelevant to whether the Commissioner will approve a new branch
for a bank.
28

3.

Even if Field of Membership Related to Credit Union
Branches. Field of Membership Does Not Relate to Credit
Union Service Organizations.

CUSC is a credit union service organization ("CUSO").

There

are no branching requirements for a CUSO, nor does "field of
membership" relate to CUSOs. Therefore, even if "field of
membership" related to branches of a credit union, it would have
been inappropriate for the Commissioner to have considered the
multi-county field of membership policy with respect to the CUSC
Application, because CUSOs are not subject to field of membership
restrictions, nor to the branching requirements of the Financial
Institutions Act (Title 7, Utah Code Ann.).
4.

Even if Field of Membership was Applicable to the CUSC
Application, the Commissioner Would Still Have Had
Solid Grounds for Approving the CUSC Application.

In their brief, UBA lists as owners of CUSC eight credit
unions which UBA asserts have multi-county fields of membership.
Those credit unions are:

Cypress Credit Union; Jordan Credit

Union; MetroWest Credit Union; Salt Lake City Credit Union;
Granite Credit Union; Transwest Credit Union; Mountain America
Credit Union; and Hercules Credit Union.

(UBA Br. at 5.)

Each of the eight credit unions named by UBA, however, has
its home office in Salt Lake County.

At the time the CUSC

Application was filed, CUSC was considering opening its first
office in Salt Lake County, and no other offices were, or are
currently, under consideration.

With their home offices located

in Salt Lake County, these eight credit unions probably have most
of their members residing in Salt Lake County.

Opening a branch

of each credit union in the county in which each has its home
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office would not have been hard to justify, given the proposed
location and the benefits to credit union members that were
testified to at the hearing.

If the field of membership

limitation applied to CUSC, the fact that the home offices of the
eight credit unions named by UBA in its brief are located in the
county in which CUSC proposes to put its first office —
only location discussed by CUSC thus far —

and the

would certainly give

the Commissioner grounds to approve the CUSC Application.

This

would be true even if UBA's interpretation of Utah Code Ann- § 79-3(5) (1989) were correct, and those eight credit unions had to
limit their fields of membership on a county basis to only those
persons residing in one named county, and even if they all
selected a county other than Salt Lake County!

If a credit union

has members in Salt Lake County, it can open a branch to serve
those members, no matter how few, if the credit union's board of
directors approves the branch, and the Commissioner finds opening
of the branch will not cause the

credit union to be in an

unsound financial condition.
B.

The Commissioner's Interpretation of the Multi-County Fields
of Membership is Correct
Assuming the multi-county field of membership issue is

relevant to the CUSC Application, this Court should still affirm
the Commissioner's approval of the CUSC Application, because the
Commissioner's interpretation on this issue is correct.
The duties and responsibilities of the Supervisor of Credit
Unions are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-208 (1988), which,
in relevant part, reads:
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7-1-208. Supervisor of credit unions - Designation of
examiner as - Qualifications - Responsibilities - Bond.
(1) The commissioner shall designate an examiner as
supervisor of credit unions who shall be a citizen of the
United States and shall have sufficient training and
experience in the business of credit unions or as an
employee of a state or federal agency supervising credit
unions to demonstrate his qualifications and fitness to
perform the duties of his office.
(2) The supervisor of credit unions is responsible,
subject to the direction and control of the commissioner,
for the general supervision and examination of all credit
unions subject to the jurisdiction of the department and
other institutions assigned to him by the commissioner.
He shall assist and advise the commissioner in the
execution of the laws of this state relating to all such
institutions, and shall perform other duties prescribed
in this title or assigned to him by the commissioner.
[Emphasis added.]
When Mr. Kwant wrote the Kwant Memorandum, he was clearly
exercising the statutory and assigned duties of his office to
advise Commissioner Weis of how Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) should
be interpreted for the proper regulation of credit unions.
Commissioner Weis then exercised her authority and the duties of
her office also to make such interpretations, and approved Mr.
Kwant's recommendations.

The Kwant Memorandum itself indicates

Mr. Kwant had carefully considered such matters as the lifting by
the Legislature of restraints on branching by financial
institutions in the State, and the need for credit unions to
grow.

In addition, though, the following points illustrate why

Mr. Kwant's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) was not
incorrect.
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1.

Statutory Support.

Title 68, Utah Code Ann., is titled "Statutes," and Chapter
3 therein is titled "Construction."

Section 12 of Chapter 3

reads as follows:
68-3-12. Rules of construction.
(1) In the construction of these statutes, the
following general rules shall be observed, unless such
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context
of the statute:
(a) The singular number includes the plural, and
the plural the singular.
* * * * *

The interpretation given to Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) in the
Kwant Memorandum, allowing credit unions to include in fields of
membership all persons living in "counties," rather than just all
persons living in the one "county" in which a credit union has
its main office, is certainly not "inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the context of" Utah
Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5).

Indeed, when one looks at the broad array

of categories in Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3, which a credit union may
use to define its field of membership, there is no reason to
suppose the Legislature intended the word "county" to limit
geographical fields of membership to only one county.
Under the various subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3, a
credit union could include in its field of membership anyone
employed by a governmental agency, any school teachers, any
firefighters, or any person involved in law enforcement.

It is

reasonable to assume persons fitting in each of those categories
live in each county in the State.
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If a credit union is willing

to try to serve all government employees from San Juan County to
Box Elder County, and from Washington County to Daggett County,
which it clearly could lawfully do under subsection (a) of Utah
Code Ann, § 7-9-3(5), there is no reason to read "county" in
subsection (b) of that section as limiting membership to only the
county in which a credit union has its main office.
2

*

DFI is Entitled to have the Court Give Judicial
Deference to DFI's Interpretation of the Statutes it is
Charged with Administering.

The Commissioner and DFI are charged with supervising and
regulating the activities of banks, savings and loan
associations, credit unions, industrial loan corporations, and
other related entities.

(Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-501 (Supp. 1993).)

Chapter 1 of Title 7, Utah Code Ann., provides the general powers
the Commissioner has to carry out these responsibilities.
cursory glance at those powers —
Ann. § 7-1-301 —

Even a

especially those in Utah Code

shows the broad discretion and great powers

given to the Commissioner to carry out those responsibilities.
Chapter 2 of Title 7 deals with supervisory actions, including
the taking of possession of a financial institution.

Again, the

Commissioner exercises great powers and discretion in this area;
the Commissioner can take possession of a financial institution
without court approval, as long as the requisite findings are
made, and "within a reasonable time" after taking possession, the
Commissioner institutes court action.
and -2.)

(Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-2-1

While in possession, the Commissioner can recommend

plans of liquidation, reorganization, or rehabilitation, and the
reviewing Court cannot overturn the Commissioner's determinations
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unless they are found to be arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or
contrary to law.

(Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-2(4) and -12(1).)

Chapter 3 relates to the regulation of banks, Chapter 5 to the
regulation of "trust business," Chapter 7 to savings and loan
associations, Chapter 8 to industrial loan corporations, and
Chapter 9 to credit unions.
With all these great discretionary powers in so many areas,
the Commissioner and DFI employees —

and especially a supervisor

of a particular class of financial institutions —

must have

experience and expertise in administering these laws.

In putting

together his memorandum, Mr. Kwant used that expertise to give a
reasonable interpretation to Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5), and
Commissioner Weis used her expertise when she approved the Kwant
Memorandum.
The Kwant Memorandum was a logical outgrowth of the changes
which had taken place with respect to branching in Utah.

Prior

to the July 1, 1981 effective date of the Financial Institutions
Act of 1981 (Title 7, Utah Code Ann.) ("1981 Act"), branching was
limited in the State.

The annotations to former Utah Code Ann. §

7-3-6 (1971) (the law prior to enactment of the 1981 Act)
indicate banks were prohibited from branching prior to 1933.
From then until enactment of the 1981 Act, banks could establish
branches, but basically only in cities of the first class or in
unincorporated parts of counties in which were located a city of
the first class.

The 1981 Act authorized banks to establish

branches basically anywhere a bank could show a need.
Ann. §§ 7-3-4 and -5 (1981).)

(Utah Code

On the other hand, even under the
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1981 Act, the only statutory requirement for a credit union to
establish a branch was that its board of directors authorize the
branch, and notification of the establishment of the branch be
given to the Commissioner. Then, in the 1983 General Session of
the Legislature, Utah Code Ann. § 7-1-708 was amended to read
approximately as it does now. As noted above in the discussion
under paragraph II.A.2., under this statute, a financial
institution of any class may now establish a branch in any
location, unless the Commissioner finds the chances for success
of the branch is unlikely, or establishment of the branch would
severely impair the financial condition of the financial
institution, or the financial institution's management has not
demonstrated an ability to supervise a banking operation.

Thus,

with the liberalization of the branching laws by the Legislature
in early 1983, it was not a great stretch of logic for the
Supervisor of Credit Unions, and the Commissioner, to interpret
Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) as they did.
Furthermore, not only has this interpretation been in effect
for now over ten years, but it has received the approval of three
different Commissioners: Elaine B. Weis (Commissioner from May of
1981 to April of 1987); George Sutton (Commissioner from April of
1987 to May of 1992); and G. Edward Leary (Commissioner from June
199 2 to the present).

Nothing has apparently ever come to the

attention of any of these Commissioners to make him or her
believe their interpretation was incorrect.
In Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811
P.2d 664 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court embarked on a rather
35

extensive review of the standard of review courts should use in
reviewing decisions by an administrative agency, and what
deference, if any, a court should pay to the agency's
determination.

The Court stated:

In Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial
Commission [767 P. 2d 524 (Utah 1988)], this court
attempted to clarify the distinction between cases
requiring deference to agency decisions and cases which
would be reviewed using a correction of error standard.
In distinguishing the two standards, we noted that agency
decisions which are granted a more deferential review are
often mixed questions of law and fact, which require
application of specific technical fact situations to the
statutes which an agency is empowered to administer.
These are the types of decisions and applications in
which the agency's special expertise puts it in a better
position than an appellate court to evaluate the
circumstances of the case in light of the agency mission.
In
contrast,
decisions
involving
statutory
interpretation, issues of basic legislative intent, or
construction of ordinary terms in the organic statute of
an agency involve areas in which an appellate court is as
well suited to decide the legal questions as is the
agency. In cases where the basic question is what does
the law require? the standard is a correction of error
standard.
[811 P.2d at 668; footnotes omitted.]
It would be hard to find an area in which an administrative
agency exercises more discretion than in the regulation of
financial institutions.

As illustrated above, the Commissioner

must make determinations affecting virtually everything a
financial institution under DFI's jurisdiction does.

This goes

to the question of branches and fields of membership for credit
unions.

The Commissioner respectfully submits that if ever there

were a situation where, at the very least, a finding of fact is
mixed with an interpretation of law —

and therefore, under

Hurley (as cited in Savage Brothers, Inc.1, the Court should give
deference to the determination by the Commissioner —
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this is

such a case.

The Commissioner emphasizes a credit union may not

on its own amend its bylaws to include in its field of membership
person living within a county; rather, the bylaws must be
submitted to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner must
determine the expansion of the credit union's field of membership
will not adversely impact the credit union.

Only then will the

amendment become effective, and the credit union's field of
membership will be expanded.
3.

The Third Judicial District Court Dismissed UBA's
Lawsuit Which Explicitly Challenged the Commissioner's
Interpretation of the Multi-County Field of Membership.

UBA v. AFCU dealt with only one issue —

the Commissioner's

position on multi-county fields of membership.

The motions to

dismiss filed by the Commissioner and by the CU Defendants were
granted by the Third Judicial District Court for lack of standing
and laches.
While it is true the motions were granted for lack of
standing, and the dismissal with respect to laches did not apply
to UBA's challenge to CUSC, laches did apply to the challenge to
the Commissioner's position on multi-county fields of membership.
It is likely impossible under the rules of Appellate Procedure to
bring before this Court all of the arguments and evidence
presented to the Court in UBA v. AFCU/ when that evidence was not
presented, and those arguments were not made, in the hearing on
the CUSC Application.

Furthermore, since the Court in UBA v.

AFCU did not rule on the merits of the case, the relevancy of the
arguments might also be questioned.
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The Commissioner does believe, though, that for the purposes
of the instant appeal, this Court should take note of the
dismissal of UBA v. AFCU, and of the central issue in that
lawsuit•

At the hearing on the CUSC Application, the Hearing

Officer made it plain no evidence or arguments on the multicounty fields of membership would be heard at the hearing, and
none would be considered by either him in his recommendations to
the Commissioner, or by the Commissioner in his ruling on the
CUSC Application.

As the Hearing Officer informed everyone

present, no evidence would be heard on that issue because (1) it
was being litigated at that very time, and (2) DFI's policy had
been in effect for ten years, and the Commissioner did not feel
compelled to change DFI's position until a court of law told DFI
its interpretation was incorrect.

Obviously, the Commissioner

expected the Court in UBA v. AFCU would either ratify the
Commissioner's position, invalidate that position, or modify it
in some manner.

Thus there was no need for the Hearing Officer

to conduct a mini-court on the issue!

Such an effort would have

been a waste of time and effort on the part of all parties.
The Court in UBA v. AFCU has now ruled, and its ruling did
not tell the Commissioner his interpretation on multi-county
fields of membership was incorrect.

Given the circumstances, and

the parallel running of the hearing on the CUSC Application and
the issue in UBA v. AFCU, this Court should give further
deference to the Commissioner's position on multi-county fields
of membership:

since the Court in UBA v. AFCU did not overturn

DFI's position on multi-county fields of membership, and since
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the Commissioner said in light of the UBA v. AFCU lawsuit, DFI
would only change its position if directed to do so by a court,
this Court should give deference to DFI's position on this issue.
The points made in under paragraph II.A, and B. above should
be sufficient for the Court to uphold the Leary Order, However,
in the event the Court wishes further support, the following
points on standing, laches and estoppel are offered,
C.

UBA Lacks Standing to Object to the Commissioner's Position
on Multi-County Fields of Membership in this Appeal,
The following is basically a restatement of the arguments on

standing the Commissioner made in UBA v. AFCU,

The opinion of

the Third Judicial District Court speaks for itself, and which of
these arguments that Court may have adopted.

While none of these

arguments were made at the hearing on the CUSC Application (for
the reasons explained above), it seems only fair to make them
here, since UBA has raised the issue in its brief.
11-19)

(UBA Br. at

UBA likely could have been heard on this issue in the

hearing on the CUSC Application.

UBA chose instead to challenge

the Commissioner's position on multi-county branching in the
District Court, where it lost for lack of standing.

Since UBA

now wants a "second bite at the apple," even before it has
decided whether it is going to appeal the decision in UBA v.
AFCU, the Commissioner believes it to be only fair for the
Commissioner to raise before this Court the points he raised
before the Court in UBA v. AFCU regarding standing.

When the

hearing was held on the CUSC Application, a number of memoranda
had already been filed in UBA v. AFCU.
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The Commissioner was

aware of the lawsuit, and, in the interests of the parties time
and expense, deferred having the issue presented in the hearing
on the CUSC Application•

The Commissioner was willing to let the

Court in UBA v. AFCU determine the issue, and believes that that
having been done, UBA should accept that decision or appeal it,
but shouldn't get a second chance to present the issue in this
appeal.
The fundamental requirement for standing, under Utah law, is
the plaintiff must have suffered, or will suffer, a tangible
injury.

Specifically, the "plaintiff must be able to show that

he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him
a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute."

(Terracor

v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah
19 86) , quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) . )
In and of itself, UBA simply has no standing to ask this
Court to review the Leary Order.

UBA is a trade association,

whose membership consists of thirty-six commercial banks which
are authorized to do business in the State of Utah.

UBA had

every right to appear at the hearing on the CUSC Application; the
Commissioner specifically requested that notice of the hearing be
mailed to UBA, and he encouraged UBA's participation and input.
At the hearing, counsel for CUSC even objected to UBA's comments
and participation for lack of standing, but the Hearing Officer
overruled the objection, stating the Commissioner wanted input
from all interested persons so as to give him the best
information possible when making his decision on the CUSC
Application.
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UBA itself, however, is not a depository institution,

UBA

itself has lost no members or customers to CUSC or to any of the
credit union owners of CUSC because of DFI's position on multicounty fields of membership.

Nor is UBA threatened with losing

any of its members or customers if credit unions continue to have
multi-county fields of membership.
Under Utah law, there are two exceptions to the injury in
fact requirement.

First, there is an exception to the injury in

fact requirement where no one else besides a plaintiff —
this case, perhaps, the petitioner —

or in

has a greater interest in

the issues and the issues are unlikely to be raised unless
brought by the plaintiff or petitioner.
In UBA v. AFCU, UBA asserted its member banks had been
injured by the Commissioner's policy on multi-county fields of
membership.

However, none of those banks ever joined UBA as a

named plaintiff in that suit.

Furthermore, although its doubtful

anyone likes spending money on legal fees, it is safe to assume
the banks UBA asserted were injured by the Commissioner' multicounty field of membership policy were involved in litigation
every day, both as plaintiffs and as defendants, i.e., these
banks knew how to bring, and were capable of funding, a lawsuit
such as UBA v. AFCU.

Thus, this first exception did not apply.

The second area in which courts will make an exception in
cases in which the issues are unique and of great public
interest.

(See Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry,

716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986).

See also Jenkins v. Finlinson,

607 P.2d 289, 290 (Utah 1980), and Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d
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442, 443 (Utah 1978) •) The issues in those cases involved,
respectively, the failure by a State agency to follow its own
procedures, the right of members of the Utah State Bar to serve
in the State Legislature, and the right of public school teachers
to serve in the State Legislature.

In none of even those cases,

though, was it held the plaintiff had standing to bring the
respective suits, and, the Commissioner submits, with all due
respect, the issue in UBA v. AFCU did not rise anywhere near to
the level of the "great public interest" of the issues in
Terracor or Jenkins v. Finlinson or Jenkins v. State.

Thus this

second exception did not benefit UBA either, and UBA by itself
did not have standing to bring that suit, nor does it have
standing to bring this appeal.
UBA, however, said it brought the suit not on its own
behalf, but on behalf of its member banks. When an association
seeks to brings suit on behalf of its members, it must meet
additional standing requirements in addition to that of the
general standard.

Besides demonstrating its members have

suffered injury, the association must also show the participation
of the individual members of the association is not indispensable
to the lawsuit.

(Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743

P.2d 1166, 1175 (Utah 1987).

See also Ferguson Police Officers

v. City of Ferguson, 670 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Miss. App. 1984).)
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In

addition, the association must show the interests which it seeks
to protect are relevant to the organization's purpose.6
Under the criteria set forth above, UBA failed to meet any
of the requirements necessary for standing in UBA v. AFCU to
challenge the implementation of the shared branching facility.
Specifically:
1.

Specific Injury Requirement

(a) The individual members of UBA have suffered no actual
or potential injury.

At best, UBA's assertion its members will

lose business is merely hypothetical and unlikely to actually
occur.

See, e.g., York v. Unqualified Washington County, 714

P.2d 679, 680 (Utah 1986); Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County
Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1145-46 (Utah 1981); Baird v. State,
574 P.2d 713, 715-17 (Utah 1978).

See also

Common Cause v.

Department of Energy, 702 F.2d 245, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
The Commissioner and DFI supervise four classes of
depository institutions in Utah:

banks; savings and loan

associations; credit unions; and industrial loan companies.

Each

class has certain privileges not enjoyed by any other class.
Each class also has certain restrictions not placed on any other
class.
Even a cursory glance at the powers and responsibilities of
the Commissioner and DFI, as shown primarily in Chapter 1 of
6

While this requirement has not been explicitly adopted by
the Utah Supreme Court, it nevertheless is a requirement for
standing under federal law, and the Utah Supreme Court has
suggested it might be a requirement for standing under Utah law,
as well. See Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d
1166, 1175, fn. 10 (Utah 1987).
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Title 7, Utah Code Ann., will show the difficult task the
Commissioner and DFI must undertake in balancing the many
interests they must consider while regulating these classes.
Perhaps these interests are best summed up in Utah Code Ann. § 71-301(4) (1988), which provides:
7-1-301. Powers and duties of commissioner as to
financial institutions - Rules to be promulgated.
In addition to the powers, duties, and
responsibilities specified in this title, the
commissioner has all the functions, powers, duties, and
responsibilities with respect to institutions, persons,
or businesses subject to the jurisdiction of the
department contained in this article. The commissioner
may adopt and issue rules consistent with the purposes
and provisions of this title, and may revise, amend, or
repeal them:
* * * * *

(4) to safeguard the interest of shareholders,
members, depositors, and other customers of
institutions and other persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the department;
* * * * *

In the times in which we live, a financial institution which
is not growing will likely experience problems, and ultimately
may cease to exist.

Competition in all areas is a reality.

There is competition between financial institutions of the same
class, and there is competition between financial institutions of
different classes.

Perhaps the main competition for all

financial institutions in this day, however, comes not from
competitors within the same class, or even from financial
institutions in other classes, but rather from non-financial
institutions.

For example: insurance companies offer products

such as universal life policies; securities brokerages will help
companies finance needs directly through investors, rather than
borrowing from a financial institution; automobile companies
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solicit people in every state to obtain the credit card they
issue; mutual funds will often provide a higher rate of return on
investments; and money market funds can also offer higher rates
of investments while allowing customers access to their funds
through the equivalent of checking accounts.

Thus, each

financial institutions faces competition for its customers, and
its business, from within its own class, from other financial
institutions, and from non-financial institutions, as well.
Given this scenario, it is unlikely even any of UBA's member
banks could show direct injury resulting from a credit union's
being able to include in its field of membership all persons
living in county other than the county in which the credit union
has its home office.
(b)

Even if a UBA member bank could show it had lost

business due to the Commissioner's interpretation of Utah Code
Ann. § 7-9-3(5), a judicial decision to prohibit that
interpretation is unlikely to redress the bank's injury because
credit unions will find alternate ways to do business throughout
every area in Utah.

Again, there would be nothing to prevent a

credit union from amending its bylaws to include persons of a
certain profession who might live in each of the counties, or to
prevent one credit union in each county from organizing and
including all person residing in each county.

Acquisitions and

mergers would likely occur, and the acquiring credit union would
then include in its field of membership those persons who had
been eligible for membership in the acquired credit union.

Since

even were the Court were to grant UBA the relief it seeks in this
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action, the alleged injuries would not be remedied, the banks
would not have standing to bring this appeal.

See e.g. Slama v.

Attorney General, 428 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Mass, 1981).
(c) UBA's attempt to attack the Commissioner's position on
multi-county fields of membership is inappropriate, because the
purpose of that statute is to regulate membership in credit
unions, and not to preserve business for banks.

See, e.g.,

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 25
L.Ed 184, 188 (U.S. 1970) .
2.

Necessity of Individual Participation

Even if the individual UBA member banks themselves would
have standing to bring this appeal, it is inappropriate for UBA
to appeal on its own, because the alleged injury to UBA's member
banks is so hypothetical that at least one bank would have to be
a party to the appeal to prove how it would be injured allowing
CUSC to offer a shared branching facility.

See

Society of Prof.

Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1175 (Utah 1987).
3.

Relevancy of Suit to UBA's Purpose

Finally, it is inappropriate for the UBA to bring this suit
because prohibiting construction of the shared branching facility
is irrelevant to the UBA's purpose.

The UBA's purpose is to

promote the interests of its member banks. While bringing this
action might arguably assist the UBA's member banks by removing
one mode of competition by one group of competitors, removing
competition and competitors is not one of UBA's purposes.

See

Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1175
(Utah 1987).
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In short, UBA, in and of itself, lacks standing to bring
this appeal.

The Commissioner also submits none of UBA's member

banks have standing to bring this appeal either; in fact, the
Court in UBA v. AFCU determined that even bringing in a named
bank would not have cured the problem with standing for UBA or
any bank that might be added as a plaintiff.
As noted above, the Commissioner sought participation by any
interested person in the hearing on the CUSC Application.

The

Commissioner appreciated the participation by UBA, and the points
they brought out in the hearing.

Nonetheless, accepting an

invitation to participate, and participating, in an
administrative hearing, such as this, does not necessarily mean a
party would have standing to participate in the hearing, or that
the party would have standing to lodge an appeal from a ruling by
the administrative body that was unfavorable to the participant.
Such is the case here; UBA's participation in the hearing was
solicited and welcome, but UBA lacks standing to appeal the Leary
Order.
D.

UBA's Challenge to the Commissioner's Position on MultiCounty Fields of Membership is Barred by Laches and Estoppel
The interpretation of "limited field of membership" relating

to a "county" in Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) was approved by
Commissioner Weis on September 9, 1983. The Commissioner and DFI
have made no secret of this interpretation, and credit unions
have been adding to their "limited fields of membership" the
residents of more than one county almost since the interpretation
was approved.

UBA and its member banks have been aware of this

interpretation for nearly ten (10) years; not only have they at
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least tacitly condoned this interpretation, they have actually
encouraged it and made it possible in some instances.
In Leaver v. Gross, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court held laches is contingent upon the establishment of
two elements:

(1) the lack of diligence on the part of the

plaintiff; and (2) an injury to the Defendant owing to such lack
of diligence.

(610 P.2d at 1264.) Moreover, this same Court

held in Papanikolas Brothers Enter, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center
Assoc., 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) that:
Laches is not mere delay, but delay that works a
disadvantage to another.
To constitute laches, two
elements must be established: (1) The lack of diligence
on the part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant
owing to such lack of diligence. Although lapse of time
is an essential part of laches, the length of time must
depend on the circumstances of each case, for the
propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon
the gravity of the prejudice suffered by defendant and
the length of plaintiff's delay.
Id. at 1260 (footnote omitted).
In the instant matter, if Commissioner Weis' interpretation
of Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-3(5) was erroneous, as asserted by UBA,
since UBA and its member banks have had knowledge of this
interpretation for nearly ten years, there has been a lack of
diligence and/or unexplained delay in UBA's assertion of its
position.
Just as importantly, UBA's lack of diligence in asserting
their claims has injured the credit unions which are regulated by
DFI.

Those credit unions have expended time and money, and built

or acquired facilities, to obtain members in counties beyond the
county in which the credit unions have their home office.

If the

allegations UBA raises in its Complaint had been made when UBA
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and its member banks first became aware of this interpretation,
and the interpretation had been determined to be erroneous, most *
of these credit unions would have been spared a great deal of
expense.

At this late date, not only would the credit unions be

harmed, but their members would also be harmed if the credit
unions were now to be forced to jettison branches and members in
these counties.
Moreover, lacheg effectuates a waiver of the claim.

"The

defense of laches is a form of waiver, or if not strictly waiver,
conduct of the type which equity will deem sufficient to bar
application of a remedy otherwise available."

Packarski v.

Smith, 147 A.2d 176 (Del. Ch. 1958).
UBA's delay in asserting the allegations in its Complaint
constitutes a waiver of its right to make those allegations and
bring this suit.

In Hoffa v. Hough, 30 A.2d 761 (Md. 1943), the

Court of Appeals of Maryland held, "Equity will not aid a
claimant who has slept on his right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, thereby suffering his claim to become
stale and causing prejudice to an adverse party, such manifest
neglect constituting an implied waiver."

Id. at 763 1

(emphasis added).
For the same reasons, UBA now should be precluded from
maintaining this suit. As previously stated, this interpretation
had been in effect for nearly ten years before UBA brought this
suit.

It is fair to conclude UBA "slept on its rights" during

this long period of time, and hence has impliedly waived the
right to bring an action now that would surely prejudice the
defendant credit unions.
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In its Order granting the motions to dismiss of the
Commissioner and the CU Defendants, the Court in UBA v. AFCU said
dismissal for laches and estoppel did not apply to UBA's
complaint against CUSC.

Obviously UBA could not have brought its

challenge against CUSC at anytime within the past ten years,
since CUSC has now been organized for only a little over a year.
Thus the Court in UBA v. AFCU rightly ruled laches and estoppel
would not apply to UBA's challenge to CUSC.

However, where UBA

in its petition for review of the Leary Order has again raised
the multi-county field of membership issue to attack the approval
of the CUSC Application, and it was the failure of UBA to
challenge that policy until it had been around for ten years that
caused the Court in UBA v. AFCU to rule that laches and estoppel
would apply to UBA's challenge to the policy in that suit, this
Court should apply laches and estoppel to UBA's attempt to
challenge the policy on appeal with respect to the approval of
the CUSC Application.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the Court should uphold the determination of the
Commissioner to approve the CUSC Application.
DATED this

day of May, 1994
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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EXHIBITS

7-1-103.

Definitions.

As used in this title:
(1) "Bank v means any person authorized under the laws of this state,
another state, the United States, the District of Columbia, or any territory of the United States to accept deposits from the public. "Bank" does
not include a federal savings and loan association or federal savings
bank, a savings and loan association or savings bank subject to Chapter 7
of this title, a thrift institution subject to Chapters 8 and 8a of this title, a
federally chartered credit union, or a credit union subject to Chapter 9 of
this title.
(2) "Banking business" means the offering of deposit accounts to the
public and the conduct of such other business activities as may be authorized by this title.
(3) "Board" means the Board of Financial Institutions as described in
Section 7-1-203.
(4) "Branch" means a place of business of a financial institution, other
than its home office, at which deposits are received and paid. It does not
include a consumer funds transfer facility as defined in Section 7-16-2.
(5) "Business trust" means an entity engaged in a trade or business
created by a declaration of trust, by the terms of which property is transferred to trustees, to be held and managed by them for the benefit of
persons holding transferable certificates representing the beneficial interest in the trust estate and assets.
(6) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of financial institutions
as described in Section 7-1-202.
(7) "Control" means the power, directly or indirectly, to:
(a) direct or exercise a controlling influence over the management
or policies of a financial institution, or the election of a majority of
the directors or trustees of an institution; or
(b) (i) vote 20% or more of any class of voting securities of a financial institution by an individual; or
(ii) vote more than 5c/c of any class of voting securities of a
financial institution by a person other than an individual.
(8) "Credit union" means any cooperative, nonprofit association incorporated under Chapter 9 of this title, or under the Federal Credit Union
Act.
(9) "Department" means the Department of Financial Institutions as
described in Section 7-1-201.
(10) "Depository institution" means any bank, savings and loan association, savings bank, thrift institution, credit union, or any other institution which holds or receives deposits, savings, or share accounts, or issues
certificates of deposit, or provides to its customers other depository accounts which are subject to withdrawal by checks, drafts, or other instruments or by electronic means to effect third party payments.
(11) "Depository institution holding company" means:
(a) a person other than an individual that has control over any
depository institution or becomes a holding company of a depository
institution under Section 7-1-703; or
(b) a person other than an individual that the commissioner finds,
after considering the circumstances of any specific case, is or is capable of exercising a controlling influence over a depository institution
by means other than those specifically described in this section. Except as provided in Subsection 7-1-703(7), a person is not a depository
institution holding company by virtue of its ownership or control of
shares acquired in securing or collecting a debt previously contracted
in good faith.
(12) "Directly connected" means being an employee, officer, director, or
shareholder of an institution or a substantial depositor of or substantial
borrower from a depository institution.
(13) "Financial institution" means any institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department because of this title.

(14) "Financial institution holding company" means a person, other
than an individual that has control over any financial institution or any
person that becomes a financial institution holding company under this
chapter including a foreign bank holding company and a foreign savings
and loan holding company. Ownership of a service corporation by a depository institution does not make that institution a financial institution
holding company. A person holding 5% or less of the voting securities of a
financial institution is rebuttably presumed not to have control of the
institution. A trust company is not a holding company by reason of its
owning or holding 20% or more of the voting securities of a financial
institution in a fiduciary capacity, unless the commissioner finds, after
notice and opportunity for hearing, that the trust company exercises a
controlling influence over the management or policies of the financial
institution.
(15) "Foreign depository institution" means a depository institution
whose home office is located in and whose operations are conducted principally in a state other than Utah, in a territory or possession of the
United States, or in the District of Columbia.
(16) "Foreign depository institution holding company" means a depository institution holding company whose subsidiary depository institution's operations are conducted principally in a state other than Utah, in
a territory or possession of the United States, or in the District of Columbia.
(17) "Guaranty corporation" means the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation of Utah.
(18) "Industrial loan corporation" means a corporation or other business entity conducting the business of an industrial loan corporation as
described in Chapter 8 of this title.
(19) "Insolvent" means the status of a financial institution which is
unable to meet its obligations as they mature.
(20) "Institution" means a corporation, partnership, trust, association,
joint venture, pool, syndicate, unincorporated organization, or any form of
business entity.
(21) "Institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department" means
an institution or other person described in Article 5 doing business or
having an office in this state except to the extent those institutions or
persons are engaged solely in making or soliciting loans to residents of
this state or loans secured by property located in this state or are engaged
solely in the activities described in Subsection 16-10a-1501(2)(l).
(22) "Liquidation" means the act or process of winding up the affairs of
an institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department by realizing
upon assets, paying liabilities, and appropriating profit or loss, as provided in Chapter 2 of this title.
(23) "Liquidator" means a person or an agency or instrumentality of
this state or of the United States appointed to conduct a liquidation.
(24) "Member of a savings and loan association" means:
(a) a person holding a savings account of a mutual association;
(b) a person borrowing from, assuming, or obligated upon a loan or
an interest in a loan held by a mutual association; or
(c) any person or class of persons granted membership rights by
the articles of incorporation or the bylaws of an association. A joint
and survivorship or other multiple owner or borrower relationship
constitutes a single membership.
(25) "Negotiable order of withdrawal" means a draft drawn on a NOW
account.
(26) "NOW account" means a savings account from which the owner
may make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instruments for the
purpose of making transfers to third parties. A NOW account is not a
demand deposit, and the owner of a NOW account, and any third party
holder of an instrument requesting withdrawal from the account, does not
have the legal right to make withdrawal on demand.

(27) "Operations are principally conducted" means that state where the
largest percentage of the aggregate deposits of a depository institution or
all depository institution subsidiaries of a depository institution holding
company are held.
(28) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, joint venture, pool, syndicate, sole proprietorship, unincorporated organization, or any form of business entity.
(29) "Receiver" means a person or an agency or instrumentality of this
state or of the United States appointed to administer and manage an
institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department in receivership, as
provided in Chapter 2 of this title.
(30) "Receivership" means the administration and management of the
affairs of an institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department to
conserve, preserve, and properly dispose of the assets, liabilities, and
revenues of an institution in possession, as provided in Chapter 2 of this
title.
(31) "Savings account" means any deposit or other account at a depository institution which is not a transaction account.
(32) "Savings and loan association" means a mutual or capital stock
savings association, a savings and loan association, a mutual or capital
stock savings bank, or a building and loan association subject to the
provisions of this title including all federal associations as defined in
Subsection 7-7-2(3) and all foreign associations as defined in Subsection
7-7-2(4).
(33) "Service corporation" means a corporation or other business entity
owned or controlled by one or more financial institutions which is engaged or proposes to engage in business activities related to the business
of financial institutions.
(34) "Subsidiary" means a business entity under the control of a financial institution.
(35) "Thrift institution" means any industrial loan corporation authorized by the commissioner to receive deposits as provided in Chapter 8. It
does not include a bank, a savings and loan association, or a-credit union.
(36) "Transaction account" means a deposit, account, or other contractual arrangement in which a depositor, account holder, or other customer
is permitted, directly or indirectly, to make withdrawals by check or other
negotiable or transferable instrument, a payment order of withdrawal, a
telephone transfer, or other electronic means, or by any other means or
device for the purpose of making payments or transfers to third persons.
This term includes but is not limited to demand deposits, NOW accounts,
savings deposits subject to automatic transfers, and share draft accounts.
(37) "Trust company" means any person authorized to conduct a trust
business as provided in Chapter 5.
(38) "Utah depository institution" means a depository institution
which is organized under the laws of this state and whose home office is
located in this state, or which is organized under the laws of the United
States and whose home office is located in this state.
(39) "Utah depository institution holding company" means a depository
institution holding company whose principal subsidiary depository institution is a Utah depository institution.

7-1-208-

Supervisor of credit unions — Designation of examiner as — Qualifications — Responsibilities —
Bond-

(1) The commissioner shall designate an examiner as supervisor of credit
unions who shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have sufficient
training and experience in the business of credit unions or as an employee of a
state or federal agency supervising credit unions to demonstrate his qualifications and fitness to perform the duties of his office.
(2) The supervisor of credit unions is responsible, subject to the direction
and control of the commissioner, for the general supervision and examination
of all credit unions subject to the jurisdiction of the department and other
institutions assigned to him by the commissioner. He shall assist and advise
the commissioner in the execution of the laws of this state relating to all such
institutions, and shall perform other duties prescribed in this title or assigned
to him by the commissioner.
(3) Before entering upon his duties, the supervisor of credit unions shall
give to the state a corporate surety bond in form and amount determined by
the department, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties. The
premium on the bond shall be paid by the state.

7-1-303-

Joint operations and information e x c h a n g e by institutions.

The commissioner may authorize institutions subject to the jurisdiction of
the department to engage in such joint and cooperative actions as the commissioner finds will be in the public interest, such as, but not limited to:
(1) mutual exchange of financial information as to depositors, borrowers, and other customers;
(2) joint use of facilities;
(3) joint operation of clearing houses and other facilities for payment of
checks, drafts, or other instruments drawn on or issued by various classes
of depository institutions;
(4) joint participation in lending programs to promote the public welfare;
(5) joint risk management services; and
(6) joint ownership, operation, or furnishing of electronic funds transfer
services.

7-1-501. Institutions and persons subject to jurisdiction of
department.
The following persons and institutions are subject to the jurisdiction of the
department and are subject to supervision and examination by the department as provided in this title and the rules and regulations of the department:
(1) all banks;
(2) all savings and loan associations;
(3) all service corporations;
(4) all credit unions;
(5) all thrift institutions and industrial loan corporations;
(6) all trust companies;
(7) all escrow companies;
(8) all other persons or institutions engaged in this state in the business of:
(a) guaranteeing or insuring deposits, savings, share accounts,
thrift accounts, or other accounts in depository institutions doing
business in this state, except the Credit Union Insurance Corporation
or any insurer qualified under the insurance laws of this state to
insur i shares and deposits of credit unions;
(b) operating loan production offices for a depository institution
located outside this state;
(c) allowing persons to effect third party payments from loan,
charge, or other accounts by checks, drafts, or other instruments or
by electronic means;
(d) operating an office in this state for the purpose of soliciting
deposits or similar evidence of indebtedness or participation interests
in them;
(9) all corporations or other business entities owning or controlling an
institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department; and
(10) all subsidiaries and affiliates of an institution subject to the jurisdiction of the department.

7-1-502, Limitations on jurisdiction of department,
(1) The jurisdiction of the department with respect to the persons and institutions described in § 7-1-501 is limited as follows: (a) to t h a t portion of the
business activities conducted by those persons and institutions in this state or
with residents of this state, whether conducted solely or jointly by combination or contract; (b) to business activities not wholly regulated or supervised
by an agency or department of the United States or another agency or department of this state; and (c) to business activities which the department is not
prohibited from regulating by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
(2) The jurisdictional limitations set forth in Subsections (l)(a) and (b) do
not prohibit the commissioner from requiring all institutions described in
§ 7-1-501 to make available for his inspection and examination their books
and records applicable to their business subject to the jurisdiction of the department conducted in this state or with residents of this state, and to make
available any reports filed with any federal or state supervisory agencies
having jurisdiction over them.
(3) The provisions of Subsection 7-l-501(7)(d) may not be construed to authorize the department to supervise or regulate, by setting interest rates or
otherwise, the operation of money market mutual funds or similar investments subject to supervision and regulation by another department or agency
of this state or of the United States.
(4) Notwithstanding the jurisdictional limitations set forth in Subsection
(1), the department has jurisdiction over the establishment of an office for the
purpose of soliciting deposits or similar evidence of indebtedness or participation interests in them or the acquisition or merger or consolidation with a
depository institution or a depository institution holding company whose operations are principally conducted in this state by a depository institution or a
depository institution holding company whose operations are principally conducted outside this state.

7-1-706. Application to commissioner to exercise power —
Procedure.
(1) Except as provided in §§ 7-1-704 and 7-1-705, any person may request
the commissioner to issue any rule or order, to exercise any powers granted to
the commissioner under this title, or to act on any matter that is subject to the
approval of the commissioner by filing a request for agency action with the
commissioner.
(2) Within ten days of receipt of the request, the commissioner shall, at the
applicant's expense, cause a supervisor to make a careful investigation of the
facts relevant or material to such application.
(3) (a) The supervisor shall submit his findings and recommendations in
writing to the commissioner as required by the department's rules.
(b) The application, any additional information furnished by the applicant, and the findings and recommendations of the supervisor may be
inspected by any person at the office of the commissioner, except those
portions of the application or report that the rules of the department
designate as confidential in order to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.
(4) (a) Before the hearing is held, the commissioner shall publish notice of
the hearing at the applicant's expense in a newspaper of general circulation within the county where the applicant is located at least once a week
for three successive weeks before the date of the hearing.
(b) The notice shall include the information required by the department's rules.
(c) The commissioner shall take action within 30 days after the close of
the hearing, based on the record before him.
(5) (a) If no hearing is held, the commissioner shall approve or disapprove
the application based on the papers filed with him, together with the
findings and recommendations of the supervisor, within 90 days of receipt
of the application.
(b) The commissioner shall take action on the application by issuing
his findings of fact, conclusions, and an order, and shall mail a copy of
each to:
(i) the applicant;
(ii) all persons who have filed protests to the granting of the application; and
(iii) whatever other persons that he considers should receive copies
under the circumstances.
(6) The commissioner may impose any conditions or limitations on his approval or disapproval of an application that he considers proper to:
(a) protect the interest of creditors, depositors, and other customers of
an institution;
(b) protect its shareholders or members; and
(c) carry out the purposes of this title.

proval.
(1) Except for classes of financial institutions the commissioner may designate by rule, any Utah depository institution or foreign depository institution
authorized to do business in this state may establish one or more branches,
subject to the prior approval of the commissioner.
(2) Approval of the commissioner may be obtained by filing an application
with the commissioner in the form the commissioner prescribes. The application shall state:
(a) the proposed location of the branch;
(b) the date on which the applicant expects the branch to begin operations;
(c) the estimated annual expense to operate it; and
(d) any other information required by the department to enable it to
assess the applicant's ability to open and operate the branch.
(3) The commissioner shall approve or disapprove the application within 30
days after it is accepted as complete. If the commissioner does not approve or
disapprove an application within 30 days after it is accepted as complete, it is
considered approved.
(4) (a) The commissioner's approval of any application under this section is
considered revoked unless the branch is opened and operating within one
year of the date approved by the commissioner for commencement of
operations.
(b) The commissioner may, upon written application made before the
expiration of that period and for good cause shown, extend the date for
activation for up to two additional periods of not more than six months
each.
(5) A foreign depository institution with branches in Utah is not subject to
the requirements of this section if the branch to be established is located
outside of Utah.

7-9-3.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Capital and surplus" means shares, deposits, reserves, and undivided earnings.
(2) "Corporate credit union" means any credit union organized pursuant to any state or federal act for the purpose of serving other credit
unions.
(3) "Deposits" means that portion of the capital paid into the credit
union^by members on which a specified rate of interest will be paid.
(4) "Immediate family" means parents, spouse, surviving spouse, children, and siblings of the member.
(5) "Limited field of membership" means persons belonging to a group
or persons designated as eligible for credit union membership who:
(a) have a similar interest, profession, occupation, or formal association with an identifiable purpose;
(b) reside within an identifiable neighborhood, community, rural
district, or county;
(c) are employed by a common employer;
(d) are employed within a defined business district, industrial park
or shopping center;
(e) are employed by the credit union; or
(0 are members of the immediate family of persons within the
above groups.
(6) "Share drafts," "deposit drafts," and "transaction accounts" mean
accounts from which owners are permitted to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instruments or other orders for the purpose of making transfers to other persons or to the owner.
(7) "Shares" means that portion of the capital paid into the credit union
by members on which dividends may be paid.

In addition to the powers specified elsewhere in this chapter, a credit union
may:
(1) make contracts;
(2) sue and be sued;
(3) acquire, lease, or hold fixed assets, including real property, furniture, fixtures, and equipment as the directors consider necessary or incidental to the operation and business of the credit union, but the value of
the real property may not exceed 7% of credit union assets, unless approved by the commissioner;
(4) pledge, hypothecate, sell, or otherwise dispose of real or personal
property, either in whole or in part, necessary or incidental to its operation;
(5) incur and pay necessary and incidental operating expenses;
(6) require an entrance or membership fee;
(7) receive the funds of its members in payment for shares, share certificates, deposits, deposit certificates, share drafts, NOW accounts, and
other instruments;
(8) allow withdrawal of shares and deposits, as requested by a member
orally to a third party with prior authorization in writing, including, but
not limited to, drafts drawn on the credit union for payment to the member or any third party, in accordance with the procedures established by
the board of directors, including, but not limited to, drafts, third-party
instruments, and other transaction instruments, as provided in the bylaws;
(9) charge fees for its services;
(10) extend credit to its members, at rates established by the board of
directors and establish indexes for variable rate loans based on the credit
union's cost of funds, rates paid on accounts, or other appropriate factors
they may determine;
(11) extend credit secured by real estate;
(12) make loan participation arrangements with other credit unions,
credit union organizations, or financial organizations in accordance with
written policies of the board of directors, if the credit union that originates a loan for which participation arrangements are made retains an
interest, of at least 10% of the loan;
(13) sell and pledge eligible obligations in accordance with written policies of the board of directors;
(14) engage in activities and programs of the federal government or
this state or any agency or political subdivision of the state, when approved by the board of directors and not inconsistent with this chapter;
(15) act as fiscal agent for and receive payments on shares and deposits
from the federal government, this state, or its agencies or political subdivisions not inconsistent with the laws of this state;
(16) borrow money and issue evidence of indebtedness for a loan or
loans for temporary purposes in the usual course of its operations;
(17) discount and sell notes and obligations;
(18) sell all or any portion of its assets to another credit union or purchase all or any portion of the assets of another credit union;
(19) invest funds as provided in this title and in its bylaws;
(20) maintain deposits in insured financial depository institutions as
provided in this title and in its bylaws;
(21) hold membership in corporate credit unions organized under this
chapter or under other state or federal statutes, and in associations and
organizations of credit unions;
(22) declare and pay dividends on shares, contract for and pay interest
on deposits, and pay refunds of interest on loans as provided in this title
and in its bylaws;
(23) collect, receive, and disburse funds in connection with the sale of
negotiable or nonnegotiable instruments and for other purposes that provide benefits or convenience to its members, as provided in this title and
in its bylaws;
(24) make donations for the members' welfare or for civic, charitable,
scientific, or educational purposes as authorized by the board of directors
or provided in its bylaws;

(25) act as trustee of funds permitted by federal law to be deposited in a
credit union as a deferred compensation or tax deferred device, including,
but not limited to, individual retirement accounts as defined by Section
408, Internal Revenue Code;
(26) purchase reasonable disability insurance, including accidental
death benefits, for directors and committee members through insurance
companies licensed in this state as provided in its bylaws;
(27) provide reasonable protection through insurance or other means to
protect board members, committee members, and employees from liability arising out of consumer legislation such as, but not limited to, truthin-lending and equal credit laws and as provided in its bylaws;
(28) reimburse directors and committee members for reasonable and
necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties;
(29) participate in systems which allow the transfer, withdrawal, or
deposit of funds of credit unions or credit union members by automated or
electronic means and hold membership in entities established to promote
and effectuate these systems, if the participation is not inconsistent with
the law and rules of the department, and if any credit union participating
in any system notifies the department as provided by law;
(30) issue credit cards and debit cards to allow members to obtain access to their shares, deposits, and extensions of credit, if any such issuance is not inconsistent with the law and rules of the department;
(31) provide any act necessary to obtain and maintain membership in
the credit union;
(32) exercise incidental powers necessary to carry out the purpose for
which a credit union is organized;
(33) undertake other activities relating to its purpose as its bylaws
may provide;
(34) engage in other activities, exercise other powers, and enjoy other
rights, privileges, benefits, and immunities authorized by rules of the
commissioner; and
(35) act as trustee, custodian, or administrator for Keogh plans, individual retirement accounts, credit union employee pension plans, and
other employee benefit programs.

7-9-6. Formation of corporation to conduct credit union —
Approval of commissioner.
(1) Ten or more incorporators belonging to the same group of 200 persons or
more having a limited field of membership may, with the approval of the
commissioner, form a corporation to conduct a credit union under the provisions of this chapter and under the provisions of Title 16, Chapter 10a, Utah
Revised Business Corporation Act, and under the provisions of Title 7, Chapter 1. The provisions of this chapter take precedence over conflicting provisions of other state law governing the formation of the corporation and governing the duties and obligations of the corporation, and of its officers and
stockholders or shareholders.
(2) Except for regional and community groups, the commissioner may grant
the approval referenced in Subsection (1) when satisfied that the proposed
field of operation is favorable to the success of the credit union and that the
standing of the proposed membership will give assurance that its affairs will
be administered in accordance with this chapter.
(3) The commissioner may grant approval to financially viable applicants,
unless he finds that to do so would result in a substantial adverse financial
impact on an existing credit union having the same or substantially the same
limited field of. membership.

7-9-11.

Bylaws and amendments to be approved-

CD No credit union shall receive payments on shares, deposits, or certificates, or make any loans or other transactions, until its bylaws have been
approved in writing by the commissioner.
(2) Amendments to its bylaws shall not become operative until the bylaws
have been approved by the commissioner.

7-9-12,

Contents of bylaws.

The bylaws of a credit union shall contain at least the following:
(1) the name of the credit union;
(2) the purpose /or which it was formed;
(3) the conditions of domicile or vocation which qualify persons or cooperative societies for membership;
(4) the number of directors and procedures for their election;
(5) the term of directors;
(6) the duties of the officers;
(7) the time of year of the annual meeting of members;
(8) the manner in which members shall be notified of meetings;
(9) the number of members which shall constitute a quorum at meetings;
(10) the manner of amending;
(11) the manner in which officers may act as surety; and
(12) such other matters, rules, and regulations as the board of directors
consider necessary.

7-9-16.

Members — Eligibility — Liability — Grounds for
closing account — Denial of membership.

(1) Any person within the limited field of membership of a credit union may
be admitted to membership, upon (a) payment of any required entrance or
membership fee, (b) payment for one or more shares, and (c) compliance with
this chapter and the bylaws of the corporate credit union.
(2) Members of the credit union may not be held personally or individually
liable for payment of the credit union's debts.
(3) The credit union may close the account of any member whose actions
have resulted in any financial loss to the credit union.
(4) Denial of membership is not considered a denial of credit.

7-9-34.

Tax exemption of credit unions.

Credit unions organized under this chapter or prior law are exempt from
taxation, except that any real property or any tangible personal property
owned by the credit union shall be subject to taxation to the same extent as
other similar property is taxed. This section does not exempt credit unions
from sales or use taxes, or fees owed to the department in accordance with this
title and rules of the department.

7-9-47.

Branch offices.

(1) As used in this section "branch office" means a place where credit union
operations are conducted other than the home office.
(2) The establishment of a branch office shall be authorized by the board of
directors and shall be subject to direction from the home office. Notice of the
establishment of a branch office shall be given to the commissioner.
(3) Every branch office shall file reports and be subject to examinations as
may be required by the commissioner.
(4) The board of directors of the credit union home office, after written
notice to the commissioner, may discontinue the operation of any branch
office. The written notice must state the date operation of the credit union
branch office is discontinued.

7-16-2.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Automated teller machine" means an unmanned, free-standing
electronic information processing device, located separate and apart from
a financial institution's principal office, branch, or detached facility,
which uses either the direct transmission of electronic impulses to a financial institution or the recording of electronic impulses or other indicia
of a transaction for delayed transmission to a financial institution in
order to perform financial transactions.
(2) "Point-of-sale terminal" means a manned electronic information
processing device, other than a telephone, located at the point of sale and
separate and apart from a financial institution's principal office, branch,
or detached facility, which uses either the direct transmission of electronic impulses to a financial institution or the recording of electronic
impulses or other indicia of a transaction for delayed transmission to a
financial institution in order to perform financial transactions. However,
point-of-sale terminals includes electronic information processing devices
which interface with the telephone transmission system and which, either through the direct transmission of electronic impulses or the recording and delayed transmission of electronic impulses to a financial institution, perform financial transactions. Nothing in this definition prevents a
device which constitutes a point-of-sale terminal from being used to perform, for its operator, any internal business functions that are not financial transactions.
(3) "Financial transaction" means cash withdrawals, deposits, account
transfers, payments from deposit, loan or thrift accounts, disbursements
under a preauthorized credit agreement, or loan payments and other similar transactions initiated by an account holder.
(4) "Consumer funds transfer facility" means either an automated
teller machine, or a point-of-sale terminal, including any supporting
equipment, structures, or systems. A point-of-sale terminal owned or operated by and on the premises of a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or non-financial services and capable of
performing the functions of a consumer funds transfer facility, is not
considered to be a consumer funds transfer facility unless connected online or off-line to a financial institution for the purpose of performing
financial transactions.
(5) "Merchant" means a person primarily engaged in the retail sale or
lease of goods or non-financial services.
(6) "Control" means ownership, directly or indirectly, of a majority of
the outstanding shares or more than 50% of the shares voted for the
election of directors at the preceding election.

EXHIBITS.
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FRQ4: David A. Kwant JU&K
DATE: Sept, 9, 1983
SUBJECT: Overlapping fields of membership and bylaw amendments.

For the past several years, credit unions in general have had significant
growth not only from increased existing membership participation but also from
adding additional groups outside of their original field of membershi p. This
has included groups who were similar and .dissimilar to their original field of
membership. The extent of the .department* s authority to restrict fields of
membership as .defined" in 7-9-11 i s not stated, A review of current state law
governing credit unions indicates the following:
A.

Section 7-9-6 UCA indicates that the commissioner may approve new
credit union applications - unless to .do so would have a
substantial adverse financial impact on an existing credit union
having the same or substantially the same limited field of
membership. Therefore, a new credit union may or may not overlap
an existing credit union .depending upon how the criteria of 7-9-6
UCA were met.

B.

Bylaws, both original and amendments there to, are to be approved
by the commissioner (7-9-11). There i s no provision in the law
defining any basis on which a change in bylaws may be
disapproved, other than a conflict with or violation of law.

The state of Utah has one of the highest if not the highest percentage of
population participation in credit unions of any state in the nation. In
addition, all of the large employers in the state are already sponsoring a
credit union limiting the amount of growth or expansion that is available in
the employer related limited field of membership. Several credit unions have
expressed a.desire to include residence of areas .desi gnated in 7-9-3(5) UCA in
their field of membership.
Also, officials from employer groups have
expressed a.desire to be allowed to join a credit union other than the one the
employer is currently sponsoring. Because of the continued requests by credit
unions to broaden their field of membership and the high percentage of credit
union participation by the citizens of Utah, I would like to make the
following recommendation regarding .department approval of requests to expand
fields of membershi p:
Document 0017U
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Requests from employer groups for credit unions services from a
credit union other than the credit union currently being
sponsored by- the employer be approved.
(Credit union members
should be allowed to join that credit union which provides them
with the best service.)
Requests from existing credit unions for residential areas as
stipulated by 7-9-3(5) UCA to be included in their field of
membership be approved. This would not preclude more than one
credit union from serving the same residential area.

Document 0017U

Approved this 9th day of September, 1983.

< 5 ^ 6 K ^ /Z? &Jl
JJ?C<I^
Elaine B. Weis, Commissioner

Document 0017U

Page 2

EXHIBITS

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
STATE OF UTAH

In re:

:

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,

APPLICATION OF CREDIT UNION

:

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SERVICE CENTERS OF UTAH, INC.,

:

a Utah Corporation

:

Proceeding No. DFI-93-H001

:

Deputy Commissioner

:

Gary B. Doxey, presiding

This matter came on for hearing on October 20, 1993 in the
office of the Department of Financial Institutions.

Mr. Bruce L.

Richards of Bruce L. Richards and Associates and Mr. Robert R.
Wallace of Hanson, Epperson & Smith appeared on behalf of the
applicant, Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. Mr. Don B.
Allen of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker appeared on behalf of the Utah
Bankers Association.

Mr. Bryce H. Pettey, Assistant Attorney

General, appeared for the Department of Financial Institutions
and its Commissioner.
The following are the Findings, Conclusions, and
Recommendations of the hearing officer, Gary B. Doxey.

Included

by reference as part of this document is the hearing officer's
Memorandum Opinion dated November 18, 1993, which supports
certain legal conclusions.
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

Applicant, Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc.

("CUSC"), is a Utah corporation organized as a credit union
service organization under the authority of Utah Administrative
Code R337-4.

On June 25, 1993, CUSC submitted its application to

the Department under Utah Code Ann. §7-1-706 for authority to
operate service centers on behalf of certain credit unions.
2.

After receiving supplementary correspondence from CUSC,

the Department accepted the application as complete on August 23,
1993.

Orla Beth Peck, the Supervisor of Credit Unions, submitted

her findings and recommendations to G. Edward Leary, the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, on August 24, 1994.
3.

Well before that date, the Commissioner elected to hold

a hearing on the application and delegated the responsibility of
hearing officer to Gary B. Doxey, the Deputy Commissioner.
4.

On August 27, 1993, the Utah Bankers Association

("UBA"), a Utah nonprofit corporation that serves as a trade
association for the banking industry in Utah, filed a complaint
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief.

UBA named as defendants CUSC,

18 state-chartered credit unions, 12 of which are shareholders of
CUSC, and the Commissioner of Financial Institutions.

UBA served

the Commissioner with its complaint on September 1, 1993.
- 2-

5.

On September 3, 1993, the Department mailed notice of

the administrative hearing on the application to various trade
representatives, federal regulators, and other interested
parties, including CUSC, UBA, and their respective legal counsel.
In accordance with Subsection 7-1-706(4), notice was also
published in the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News one day
each week for three successive weeks, specifically, on September
8, 12, and 19, the last date being 30 days before the hearing.
6.

On October 19, 1993, UBA submitted a Notice of Protest

to the holding of the administrative hearing and Comments in
Opposition to the Application to Operate Service Centers.
7.

At the hearing on October 20, 1993, the hearing officer

asked first for public comment of an informal nature.

There

being none, he declared the hearing to be a formal one and
proceeded to take evidence and hear argument.

Toward the end of

the hearing, the hearing officer asked for supplemental memoranda
from CUSC and UBA.

Each filed memoranda with the Department on

October 29, 1993, and reply memoranda on November 3, 1993.
8.
grounds:

UBA objected to the legality of the hearing on two
first, that primary jurisdiction to determine whether

to approve the application had been removed to the district court
by the filing of UBA's lawsuit; and second, that the hearing was
improperly noticed and conducted under Title 63, Chapter 46b,
- 3-
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Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), rather than under
the applicable provisions of Title 7 and the Department's rules.
9.

The Department has primary jurisdiction to determine

whether to approve the application, as set forth in the hearing
officer's Memorandum Opinion.
10.

The format and conduct of the hearing were proper, as

set forth in the Memorandum Opinion.
11.

CUSC presented evidence at the hearing to support the

feasibility, public benefit, and the safety and soundness of its
planned operation of service centers.

The following findings are

appropriate:
a.

CUSC plans to own and operate service centers to

service the members of all participating credit unions.
Initially, only the current credit union shareholders of
CUSC will participate.
b.

Fifteen credit unions own shares in CUSC. They

include 12 state-chartered credit unions: Cyprus,
MetroWest, Firefighters, Granite, Transwest, Utah Central,
Salt Lake City, Jordan, Deseret First, Mountain America,
ChevronWest, and Hercules.
unions are shareholders:

Three federally chartered credit

VAMCU, Smith's Food & Drug, and

Tooele Federal.
c.

In the future, assuming it obtains proper
. 4-
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approvals, CUSC plans also to service other credit unions,
whether or not they are shareholders.

If CUSC takes this

step, the Department should reevaluate whether the applicant
complies with Rule R337-4-3.
d.

Ultimately, CUSC envisions participating in

interstate consumer funds transfer networks that will enable
it to service members of out-of-state credit unions in much
the same way that customers of financial institutions are
now able to withdraw funds from out-of-state accounts
through automated teller machines,
e.

For the present, CUSC agrees not to engage in

interstate business from credit unions chartered by other
states because of the legal questions it raises.
f.

The experience of a service center customer would

be something like the following:

A member of a

participating credit union would approach a service center
teller by first swiping an identification card through an
electronic reader.

The teller would then have access to the

member's account information by means of an electronic data
link directly to the member's credit union.

The member

could then deposit, transfer, or withdraw funds as he or she
would do at the credit union.

The member would also be able

to fill out loan applications, which would be transmitted
• 5-
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back to the credit union for approval.

The proceeds of the

loan could be disbursed by the credit union at the service
center.
g.

The employees of CUSC, not of any credit union,

will operate the service centers. They will be trained to
assist in all transactions, but the actual fund transfers
and decisions will be made by the credit union, not CUSC
employees.
h.

CUSC agrees that its employees will not, for the

present, solicit credit union memberships at the service
centers.
i.

CUSC employees will also refuse to reveal interest

rates and other information about a particular credit union,
except to the members of that credit union.
j.

The technology exists to keep accurate accounts and

segregate records for each participating credit union.
Adequate safeguards and internal controls can be put in
place to avoid defalcation of funds and other problems.
k.

There is some question about the experience of

CUSC's management and personnel, since this is a new type of
operation.

CUSC will seek expertise through consultation

with shared service centers now operating in other states,
notably, Michigan, Colorado, Alabama, Georgia, and
- 6-
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California.

Some of these states have had long experience

with shared service centers.

CUSC plans to participate with

the Southeast Group, a group of credit union service center
corporations owned by credit union leagues or affiliated
organizations from approximately 12 states. The Southeast
Group currently operates or plans to operate service centers
in all of those states.
1.

CUSC has presented uncontroverted evidence that

participation in service centers will enhance the
availability and economy of services to credit union
members.

Because the facilities are shared, they will

decrease the capital outlay required of any one credit union
to open a branch, thus improving the chances of a branch's
success and reducing the financial risk to the institution.
m.

CUSC and its service centers will be subject to

supervision and examination by the Department.

CUSC agrees

to obtain independent CPA audits of the service centers.
n.

Any credit union the Commissioner determines to be

unsafe or unsound will be allowed or may be required to
withdraw from participation in or ownership of CUSC.
q.

UBA does not question the safety and soundness of

the applicant or its proposed operation of service centers;
rather, it contests their legality.
- 7-

12.

The validity of CUSC as a credit union service

organization ("CUSO") is clear, as is the fact that CUSOs are
subject to the jurisdiction of the Department under Subsection 71-501(3) and Subsections 7-9-5(21) and (34).
13.

The Commissioner has authority to authorize CUSC to own

and operate shared service centers, as is further explained in
the hearing officer's Memorandum Opinion.
14.

Federally chartered credit unions are currently

authorized by federal regulation to participate in shared service
centers of the type CUSC proposes.

Three of CUSC's shareholders

are federal credit unions.
15.

CUSC is not a new class of depository institution

because it does not, on its own behalf, take or hold deposits or
engage in the other activities defining a depository institution.
16.

The service centers of CUSC are branches of each

participating credit union, as is further explained in the
hearing officer's Memorandum Opinion.

The service centers are

not consumer funds transfer facilities under Title 7, Chapter 16,
Consumer Funds Transfer Facilities Act.
17.

At present, CUSC is not applying to open any particular

location; thus its current application is not a branch
application, but an application for approval of the service
center concept.
- 8-
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18.

Field of membership, the main legal issue in UBA's

court case against the applicant, is not at issue here. The
Department has had a clear position on field of membership for
ten years.

RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the foregoing, I recommend that the Commissioner
approve the application of Credit Union Service Centers of Utah,
Inc., subject to at least the following conditions:
1.

Each participating credit union should submit a branch

application, with proper board approvals, for each service center
location.
2.

The Department should reevaluate CUSC's continuing

compliance with Rule R337-4 at such time as CUSC begins to
service credit unions that do not hold shares of CUSC.
3.

The Department should evaluate for safety and soundness

the ability of each participating credit union to invest or
participate in CUSC service centers. A credit union whose safety
and soundness is in jeopardy because of its investment in or
participation with CUSC should be required or allowed to withdraw
from participation.
4.

CUSC and its participating credit unions should adhere

to all applicable laws on interstate deposit taking, branching,
- 9-
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and other activities.

DATED this 18th day of November, 1993.

7

r

~TT

Gary B. Doxey
Deputy Commissioner

- 10
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the 30th day of November, 1993, I
deposited in the U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, a copy
of the MEMORANDUM OPINION, FINDINGS CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, and FINDINGS CONCLUSION AND ORDER CONDITIONALLY
APPROVING APPLICATION entered in the matter of APPLICATION OF
CREDIT UNION SERVICE CENTERS OF UTAH, INC., Proceeding No. DFI93-H001, to the parties listed on the matrix below.
Eva Rees, Administrative Assistant
Mr. Bruce L. Richards
Attorney for Applicant
1805 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104

Mr. Scott G. Earl
UTAH LEAGUE OF CREDIT UNIONS
1805 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104

Mr. Lawrence W. Alder
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION
185 South State Street
Suite 201 .
Salt Lake city, Utah 841111538

Mr. Paul A. Neuenschwander
UTAH LEAGUE OF INSURED SAVINGS
INSTITUTIONS
4185 Harrison Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 844 03

Mr. Don B. Allen
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorney for Utah Bankers
Association
70 South Main Street
P.O. BOX 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 841450385

Mr. Earl Erskine
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION
ADMINISTRATION
821 East Marion Village Road
Sandy, Utah 84 094

Ms. Irene Jorgensen
UTAH ASSOCIATION OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES
Walker Center, Suite 1450
175 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBITS

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
STATE OF UTAH

In re:

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION

APPLICATION OF CREDIT UNION

:

SERVICE CENTERS OF UTAH, INC.,

:

Proceeding No. DFI-93-H001

a Utah Corporation

:

Deputy Commissioner

:

Gary B. Doxey, presiding

This opinion considers four legal issues arising from the
October 20, 1993 hearing in the above-captioned proceeding. The
hearing dealt with the application of Credit Union Service
Centers of Utah, Inc. ("CUSC") to operate shared service centers
on behalf of certain credit unions. Additional facts and
conclusions are set forth in the Findings, Conclusions, and
Recommendations of the hearing officer dated November 18, 1993.
This opinion is supplemental to that document and is incorporated
in it by reference.
The four issues are:
1.

Whether primary jurisdiction to approve or disapprove

CUSC's application was removed to the district court by the
filing of a lawsuit on August 27, 1993, by the Utah Bankers
Association ("UBA") in Third District Court.
2.

Whether the Department of Financial Institutions'

nnnan

hearing on October 20, 1993, was improperly noticed and conducted
under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Administrative Procedures Act
("UAPA") .
3.

Whether shared service centers are legal; that is,

whether the Commissioner has authority to authorize them.
4.

"Whether the proposed service centers should be

considered branches, consumer funds transfer facilities, or both.

I.

Jurisdiction
On August 27, 1993, UBA filed a complaint in the Third

District Court of Salt Lake County seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief.

UBA named as defendants CUSC, 18 state-

chartered credit unions, 12 of which are shareholders of CUSC,
and the Commissioner of Financial Institutions.

UBA contends

that the Commissioner has incorrectly interpreted Subsection 7-93(5) to allow state-chartered credit unions to expand their
geographical fields of membership illegally beyond county lines.
That is, UBA claims that state law allows a credit union field of
membership based on geography to cover no more than one county.
UBA alleges that CUSC proposes to violate this and other
provisions of the law by providing branching services beyond
current geographical limits.

UBA served the Commissioner with

its complaint on September 1, 1993.
- 2-
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On September 3, 1993, the Department mailed notice of this
administrative hearing to various trade representatives, federal
regulators, and other interested parties, including CUSC, UBA,
and their respective legal counsel.

In accordance with

Subsection 7-1-706(4), notice was also published in the Salt Lake
Tribune and the Deseret News one day each week for three
successive weeks, specifically, on September 8, 12, and 19, the
last date being 30 days before the hearing.
UBA argues that, by filing its complaint, it transferred to
the district court primary jurisdiction over the question of
CUSC's application.

Viewed in its clearest light, UBA is

claiming that the court has removal jurisdiction to determine
whether to grant a request for administrative action.

This

concept is not supported by law.
Subsection 7-1-501(3) explicitly grants the Department
jurisdiction over "all service corporations," of which the
applicant, CUSC, is one.
under Section 7-1-706.

CUSC correctly filed its application

That section provides that the

Commissioner may issue an order with or without a hearing and
goes on to describe notice and other matters related to a
hearing.

No mention is made in that section or elsewhere in the

Code of the possibility of removing to a court the Commissioner's
jurisdiction over the application.
- 3-

Rather, Section 7-1-714

allows judicial review of "any rule, regulation, order, decision,
or ruling or other act or failure to act" by the Commissioner.
CUSC's application is a request for administrative action
concerning an entity under the Department's jurisdiction; the
hearing was held to aid in an administrative determination; and
until the Commissioner rules, primary jurisdiction over the
application lies with him rather than with the court.

Settled

principles of ripeness and administrative law support this
conclusion.

In short, the Legislature has granted to the

Commissioner, not to the court, authority to rule in the first
instance on CUSC's application.

If UBA is dissatisfied with the

Commissioner's order, it can seek judicial review.

II.

Applicability of Administrative Procedures Act
UBA's second argument against the legality of the hearing is

that it was improperly conducted under UAPA.

The Department's

notice of hearing did, in fact, cite to UAPA as well as to Title
7 (Financial Institutions Act) and departmental rules for
authority to conduct the hearing.

Subsection 63-46b-l(2)(h)

provides in relevant part:
[UAPA] does not govern: . . . state agency action under
Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3, Powers and Duties of
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and Title 7,
Chapter 2, Possession of Depository Institutions by
Commissioner, Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah Industrial Loan
Corporation Guaranty Act, Title 7, Chapter 19,
. 4-
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Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or
Holding Companies, . . . .
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l(2) (h).
At the outset of the hearing, the hearing officer explained
that it was the Department's position -- with some uncertainty -that its authority for holding the hearing came under Title 7,
Chapter 1, Article 3 and that the hearing was exempt from UAPA.
But the Department chose to follow UAPA, in addition to its own
procedures, to the extent applicable by analogy to give an added
measure of fairness to the proceeding.
6-7.

Hearing Transcript, pp.

The hearing officer also stated that the Department had

crafted its notice of hearing to avoid prejudice by taking into
account both its own rules and UAPA.

Hearing Transcript, pp.

174-180.
UBA argues, and the Department agrees -- again, with
uncertainty as to how a court would view the issue -- that all
hearings of the Department come under Article 3, because Article
3 contains the general powers of the Commissioner, including the
power to conduct hearings.

However, CUSC's application was filed

under Section 7-1-706, a section in Article 7, not Article 3; and
the section itself provides for a hearing.

A hearing on the

application is, therefore, arguably not within the UAPA exemption
for Article 3.
Adding to the Department's uncertainty is the fact that the
- 5-
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exemptions to UAPA found in Section 63-46b-l(2) are all narrowly
drawn.

That the Legislature adopted an exemption for the

Department of Financial Institutions is instructive of the
Department's need to act sometimes on very short notice and
without a hearing to protect the interests of depositors and the
public, such as in the case of insolvent institutions.

The UAPA

exemptions for Title 7, Chapters 2, 8a, and 19 all relate to
insolvency.1

A reasonable inference can be drawn that the

Legislature intended the Article 3 exemption to apply only to
similar situations in which the Commissioner needed to exercise
extraordinary power to protect the public.

By characterizing

Article 3 as containing all of the Commissioner's adjudicative
powers, one is in essence arguing that the Legislature intended
to exempt Title 7 in its entirety.

But the specificity of the

UAPA exemption does not support this assertion.

Only Article 3,

not the rest of Chapter 1, and only certain other chapters in
Title 7 are exempt.
As a practical matter, the parties were not prejudiced by
the procedural format or conduct of the hearing.

The adequacy of

the notice in terms of due process is not at issue, and the

'Chapter 8a creates the Industrial Loan Guaranty
Corporation, which at the time UAPA was adopted in 1987, was
being liquidated because of insolvency. Chapters 2 and 19 are
exclusively concerned with insolvent and troubled institutions.
- 6-
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hearing complied with the Department's rules as well as with
UAPA.

UBA argued at the hearing that the Department's rules and

relevant statutes in Title 7 afford greater protection because of
the applicability of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and subpoena
powers.

Section 7-1-309 allows the Commissioner to establish

rules consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
310 grants the Commissioner subpoena power.

Section 7-1-

However, UAPA

includes similar provisions in Section 63-46b-7. UBA failed to
show actual prejudice resulting from the conduct of the hearing
or its procedural format.

Consequently, the hearing is not

invalidated because of its references to UAPA.2

III.

Legality of Shared Service Centers
CUSC's application raises for the first time in this state

the question of whether shared service centers are legal.
Section 7-1-706, the provision under which CUSC's application was
rightly filed, provides merely a procedure to request the

2

To be sure, UAPA may diverge from Title 7 on the question
of judicial review. Under UAPA, the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to review the decision resulting from a
formal adjudicative proceeding. Section 63-46b-16. The question
is less clear for a ruling on a formal proceeding under Title 7.
Solving this question is not within the scope of determining
whether to approve CUSC's application. The Department should not
decide where an appeal lies from its ruling.

- 7-
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Commissioner to exercise his powers. The legality of service
centers depends, therefore, on whether the Commissioner has power
to authorize them, that is, whether some other provision in Title
7 allows them.
Shared service centers are not specifically named in the
Code either in the sense of an authorization or prohibition.
"Joint facilities," however, are authorized in Section 7-1-303,
which states:
The commissioner may authorize institutions subject to
the jurisdiction of the department to engage in such
joint and cooperative actions as the commissioner finds
will be in the public interest, such as, but not
limited to:
(1) mutual exchange of financial information as
to depositors, borrowers, and other customers;
(2) joint use of facilities:
(3) joint operation of clearing houses and other
facilities for payment of checks, drafts, or other
instruments drawn on or issued by various classes
of depository institutions;
(4) joint participation in lending programs to
promote the public welfare;
(5) joint risk management services; and
(6) joint ownership, operation, or furnishing of
electronic funds transfer services.
Utah Code Ann. §7-1-303.

(Emphasis added.)

The shared nature of service centers is the subject at issue
here.

Because joint use of facilities necessarily contemplates

sharing, Section 7-1-303 appears on its face to be adequate
authority to approve shared service centers.

Subsection (2) is

particularly relevant, but several of the other subsections cover
- 8-
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aspects of shared service centers too.

The expansive phrase

"such as, but not limited to" in this section allows the
Commissioner latitude to authorize even other activities in the
public interest.

Thus, the Commissioner is on solid footing to

authorize shared service centers.
The exercise of the Commissioner's authority under Section
7-1-303 is discretionary.

If the Commissioner decides to approve

service centers, he should, therefore, base his approval on
findings such as that they are feasible, beneficial, in keeping
with safety and soundness considerations, and otherwise in the
public interest.

From the perspective of the hearing officer,

there is ample evidence to support such findings; the hearing
officer's Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations set forth
his own findings in this respect.
Section 7-1-303 presents an ancillary question about whether
a credit union service organization ("CUSO") is included among
the "institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the department."
Subsection 7-1-103(21) defines that phrase as including every
entity subject to the Department's jurisdiction in Chapter 1,
Article 5.

Subsection 7-1-501(3), which is part of Article 5,

places "all service corporations" under the Department's
jurisdiction.
synonymous.

Service corporations and service organizations are

These organizations include CUSOs, which have been a
- 9-

common and accepted part of both the state and federal regulatory
fabric for many years despite somewhat sparse reference to them
in statute,3

Therefore, CUSOs are institutions subject to the

Department's jurisdiction and may, if authorized, engage in joint
activities under Section 7-1-303.

IV.

Branch or Consumer Funds Transfer Facility?
The question of whether shared service centers are correctly

characterized as branches or as consumer funds transfer
facilities ("CFTFs"), or both, is relevant to whether the
Commissioner should require branching applications from the
credit unions participating in each service center location.
Subsection 7-1-103(4) defines "branch" as:
a place of business of a financial institution, other
than its home office at which deposits are received and
paid. It does not include a consumer funds transfer
facility as defined in Section 7-16-2.

3

See Subsections 7-9-5(21) and (34), the latter being the
basis for the Department's CUSO rule, Rule R337-4. This rule
contains most of the specifics on CUSOs. On the federal side,
the authority for CUSOs is almost exclusively in regulation
rather than statute. In fact, 12 C.F.R. §701.27(d)(5)(i)
includes an explicit authorization for CUSOs to engage in "shared
credit union branch (service center) operations." UBA argues
that the federal notion of shared service centers is quite
different from what CUSC proposes in Utah. But several federal
credit unions now participate in shared service centers of the
type CUSC plans to open. They do so with National Credit Union
Association approval.
- 10 -

Utah Code Ann. §7-1-103(4).
This definition applies to the whole of Title 7. An additional
definition for credit union branches applies solely to Section 79-47, which requires the decision to open a new branch to be made
by a credit union's board of directors.

The definition reads:

As used in this section "branch office" means an office
of the credit union where deposits are paid and
received other than the home office.
Utah Code Ann. §7-1-47(1).
The difference between the two branch definitions is the
absence in Section 7-9-47 of an exclusion for CFTFs. This
difference is irrelevant, however, because the definitions in
Title 7, Chapter 16, Consumer Funds Transfer Facilities Act, make
plain that CFTFs are not branches.
CFTFs come in two varieties, according to Subsection 7-162(4); they are either automated teller machines ("ATMs") or point
of sale terminals ("POS terminals").

ATMs are defined in

Subsection 7-16-2(1) as being unmanned. free-standing electronic
information processing devices located off the premises of a main
office or branch.

POS terminals are manned electronic

information processing devices, but they are also located off
premises, according to Subsection 7-16-2(2).
From these definitions, it is necessary to conclude that
"branch" and "consumer funds transfer facility" are mutually
- 11 -

exclusive legal designations.
necessary.

Indeed, the distinction is

Without it, the state would be regulating every

computer-equipped branch as a POS terminal, because every modern
teller station is a manned electronic information processing
device.

It is not the device itself that creates a CFTF for

regulatory purposes; the designation depends on where the device
is located, and if it is at a branch it cannot be a CFTF.
Of course, the proposed service centers have a little more
in common with POS terminals than do other branches:

service

center customers need a magnetic card and a personal
identification number to access the tellers. Nevertheless,
service centers resemble branches far more than they resemble POS
terminals.

The following factors point to the service centers

being branches:

they require a bricks-and-mortar facility; they

have lobbies; they have management and staff; they offer services
like accepting loan applications and paying loan proceeds; some
of these services are normally offered at branches and not
normally available at an ATM or POS terminal; and the application
itself makes clear that CUSC intends to offer virtually all
credit union services at its service centers.

Service centers,

in short, fit the description of a "place of business of a
financial institution."

Subsection 7-1-103(4).

They are not

simply kiosks where certain transactions can be made.
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That service centers are branches does not present a legal
impediment to authorizing them.

UBA's arguments to the contrary

ultimately tie back to field of membership.

Field of membership

is the main legal issue in UBA's court case against the
applicant.

The Department has had a clear and consistent

position on field of membership for ten years and is not
constrained to change its policy until a court of competent
jurisdiction orders otherwise.

Consequently, field of membership

is not at issue for purposes of CUSC's application.
UBA cites "field of operation," a phrase found in Subsection
7-9-6(2), to resurrect field of membership as an issue.

Field of

operation is not the same as field of membership, and it is a
legal requirement only for the initial grant of authority for a
new credit union.

It is not a legal requirement for branching.

Service centers are only as geographically restricted as
other branches.

The Commissioner has discretion under Section 7-

1-708 to approve or disapprove a new branch based on legal and
practical considerations related to the potential success of a
branch.

Of course, he would not approve a credit union branch

located inconveniently in relation to the credit union members it
serves.

But that practical restriction does not create a legal

impediment to branching beyond county lines.

For example, a

credit union with a geographic field of membership that includes
- 13 -
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only Davis County residents is not legally restricted from
opening a branch in Salt Lake County to serve its members who
travel or work there.

The question of approving the new branch

would really hang on feasibility, i.e., whether enough Davis
County members would use the branch office in Salt Lake County to
justify the location.

Soliciting new members in Salt Lake County

is another matter, however, and would necessitate an approved
amendment to the field of membership.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the hearing officer concludes that the
Commissioner has jurisdiction to determine whether to approve the
application of CUSC.

The notice and conduct of the hearing were

proper and not prejudicial or invalidated because of references
to UAPA.

Shared service centers are legal in concept; that is,

the Commissioner has statutory authority to authorize them in the
public interest.

And the service centers are branches of the

participating credit unions rather than consumer funds transfer
facilities.
DATED this 18th day of November, 1993.

Gary B. ^oxey
Deputy Commissioner
- 14 -
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EXHIBITS

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
0000O0000

In Re: APPLICATION BY CREDIT
UNION SERVICE CENTERS OF
UTAH, INC. TO PROVIDE
SERVICE CENTERS FOR UTAH
CREDIT UNIONS

:
:
:
:
:

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
ORDER CONDITIONALLY
APPROVING APPLICATION

0000O0000

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.
On June 25, 1993, Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. ("CUSC"), a
Utah corporation organized as a credit union service corporation, subject to the jurisdiction
of the Department of Financial Institutions ("Department") pursuant to 7-1-501(3) of the Utah
Code, filed an application with the Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of
Utah ("Commissioner") in accordance with Section 7-1-706 of the Utah Code, requesting
approval to operate service centers on behalf of certain Utah credit unions. The Department
accepted the application as complete on August 23, 1993.
2.
The Supervisor of Credit Unions reviewed the application and on August 24,
1993, submitted her findings and recommendation that the application be conditionally
approved. On October 20, 1993, the Deputy Commissioner of the Department, designated
by the Commissioner as a hearing officer, conducted an administrative hearing on the
application and submitted his findings and recommendations on November 18, 1993, that the
application be conditionally approved. The Supervisor of Credit Union's and the Deputy
Commissioner's findings are incorporated herein by reference.
3.
CUSC is a credit union service corporation owned by fifteen credit unions
including 12 state-chartered credit unions: Cyprus, MetroWest, Firefighters, Granite,
Transwest, Utah Central, Salt Lake City, Jordan, Deseret First, Mountain America,
ChevronWest, and Hercules; and three federally chartered credit unions: VAMCU, Smith's
Food & Drug, and Tooele Federal. These stockholder credit unions have provided the initial
capitalization of CUSC. Some of the capital will be used to meet the initial cash
requirements for operations and the purchase of the software and equipment.
4.
CUSC proposes to open and operate service center(s) for participating credit
unions. CUSC proposes to offer virtuaUy all credit unions services to members of
participating credit unions on a shared cost basis.

5.
CUSC proposes to provide credit union services to other credit unions'
members, not just those of CUSC shareholders. When CUSC initiates this expanded service,
each state chartered credit union considering investing in CUSC stock, or availing itself of
CUSC services must submit an application pursuant to Rule R337-4. The Department shall
evaluate the applicant credit union based upon R337-4 criteria and determine whether the
new credit union can safely and soundly make the investment and offer this service to its
members.
6.
CUSC proposes to participate in interstate consumer funds transfer network
that wDl enable it to service members of out-of-state credit unions in much the same way that
customers of financial institutions are now able to withdraw funds from out-of-state accounts
through automated teller machines. However, CUSC shall limit its activities to comply with
all applicable interstate restrictions.
7.
With this application, CUSC is not applying to open any particular location;
thus its current application is not a branch application, but an application for approval of the
service center concept.
8.
CUSC proposes to conduct operations in the following manner: A member of
a participating credit union would approach a service center teller by first swiping an
identification card through an electronic reader. The teller would then have access to the
account information of the member by means of an electronic data link directly to the
member's credit union. The member could then deposit, transfer, or withdraw funds as he
or she would do at the credit union. All teller transactions result in immediate updating of
balances at the member's credit union. The member may approach a loan officer and
complete a loan application, which would be transmitted back to the host credit union for
approval. The proceeds of the loan could be disbursed by the credit union at the service
center. With the identification card, the member may access an electronic bulletin board that
will provide deposit and loan rates along with other credit union messages for members.
9.
During the first year of operation, CUSC proposes to share the cost of
providing service center services upon a per member basis. Each stockholder credit union
will be charged a fee based upon the number of members within a certain geographic area in
the vicinity of the facility. After the first year, the costs will be based upon the number of
transactions performed for each credit union.
10.
CUSC proposes to install conventional automated teller machines as part of the
service center operations for 24 hour access.
11.
CUSC proposes that only its employees, not those of any participating credit
union, will operate the service center(s). CUSC employees will be trained to assist in all
transactions, but the actual fund transfers and decisions shall be made by the participating
credit union, not CUSC employees.
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12.
c u s C proposes that its t iiiployn11, \ ill iiiiiiii1, I'm illiur prcsnil soliril credit mil
memberships at the service center(s).
13
CUSC proposes that its employees will not reveal interest rates or otu~proprietary information of a particular credit union, except to the members of tv.r "
union,
1 1CUSC will employ technology to keep accurate accounts and segregate records
for each participating credit union, including provisions for data back-up and system
restoration in the event of failure. CUSC shall obtain a yearly independent CPA audit.
Safeguards and internal controls will be in place to avoid defalcation of funds and other
problems. All appropriate physical security measures shall be taken to ensure physical safety
of funds and documents.
j5
g ase( j U p Qn repreSentations of National Credit Union Administration
("NCUA") officials, all deposit transactions completed at CUSC service centers will be
insured by the NCUA.
16
Since CUSC's proposal is a new concept in delivery of financial services in
Utah, CUSC's management and personnel shall seek expertise through consultation with
existing shared facilities in other states.
1

ie Department determines that the investment in, or ownership of, CUSC is
safer\ and soundness of a participating state chartered credit union, the
e a!k wed or requi red to withdrav • from, participation i n, or ownership of.

L

18.
Due to the uniqueness of the proposal and its sigi lificant public polk
implications, the Commissioner decided to hold an administrative hearing on the appbcation
to hear public comment, and to allow CUSC and any objecting party a forum *~ ~™ , ; ^
comments, prior to the Commissioner's ruling on the application.
19.
On August 27, 1993, the utan i
ocia.-on ("UBA"), a Utah nonprofit
corporation that serves as a trade association for the banking industry in Utah, fded a
complaint in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief. UBA named as defendants CUSC, 18 state-chartered credit unions, 12 of
which are shareholders of CUSC, and the Commissioner, UBA served the Commissioner
with its complaint on September 1. 1993
20.
Oi ^ . .
hearing on the application
\
. .
interested parties, including ! SC. 11 \ an.* \hcr -^p :tive legal .our :. The Department
also published notice of the hearing in *. A-K: mee u ith Subsection 7-1 *\n(4i of the Utah
Code in the Salt Lake Tribune and tL Deserct W.* '>: SepvrnhrT t;
m "* v
3

21.
On October 19, 1993, UBA submitted a Notice of Protest to the holding of the
administrative hearing and Comments in Opposition to the Application to Operate Service
Centers. UBA objected to the legality of the hearing on two grounds: first, that primary
jurisdiction to determine whether to approve the application had been removed to the district
court by the filing of UBA's lawsuit; and second, that the hearing was improperly noticed
and conducted under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, rather than
under the applicable provisions of Title 7 and the Department's rules.
22.
The administrative hearing was held on October 20, 1993. The Hearing
Officer submitted his Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations and legal opinion on
November 18, 1993.
23.
The Commissioner, based upon the record before him, giving due
consideration to the entire application process, including the Credit Union Supervisor's
Findings and favorable recommendation, the administrative hearing officer's Findings and
favorable recommendation, and consultations with the Attorney General's Office, finds that:
A.
The Department has primary jurisdiction to determine whether to
approve CUSC's application.
B.
Pursuant to Section 7-1-303 of the Utah Code, the Department has
authority to authorize CUSC to own and operate shared service center(s) as a joint and
cooperative action of participating credit unions.
C.
Pursuant to Section 7-1-501 of the Utah Code, CUSC is a credit union
service coiporation, subject to the jurisdiction of the Department, including examination and
supervision.
D.
The Department has discretion under Section 7-1-708 of the Utah Code
to approve or disapprove a new branch based on legal and practical considerations related to
the potential success of a branch.
E.
CUSC service center(s) are branches of each participating credit union,
not consumer funds transfer facilities, as defined in Section 7-16-2 of the Utah Code.
F.

CUSC service center(s) are only as geographically restricted as other

G.

The format and conduct of the administrative hearing were proper.

branches.

H.
Field of membership, the main legal issue in UBA's court case against
CUSC, is not at issue in this application. The Department has had a clear and consistent
position on field of membership for ten years.

4
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1
1 "I BA's objections go to the legality of CUSC and its proposed service
center(s), not its safety and soundness.
24
Federally chartered credit unions are currently authorized by federal regulation
to participate in shared service centers of the type CUSC proposes. Three of CUSC's
shareholders are federal credit unions.
25,
CUSC has presented uncontroverted evidence that participation in service
centers will enhance the convenience and availability of credit union services to credit union
members. The reduction of costs through a cost sharing mechanism enhances the return to
credit union members and warrants an opportunity to develop this concept of service delivery
for Utah credit union members. The risks inherent in providing any new method of
delivering services are present, but is mitigated by the phased, step-by-step approach of
CUSC. In keeping with Utah's desire to be on the forefront of technology utilization,
service centers present an undeniable opportunity for all financial institutions. Credit ur
service centers are in the best interest of the public.

r

Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, and pursuant to Section 7-1-706 of
the Utah Code, the Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah approves the
application of Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. to operate service centers on behalf
of certain Utah credit unions, subject to the following conditions;
1.
CUSC, as a service corporation, is subject to the supervision and examination
of the Department. The Department shall have the authority to conduct examinations of each
service center. CUSC shall provide quarterly financial statements to the Department, until
the Commissioner approves a different reporting requirement
2.
CUSC shall obtain an annual audit of its financial statement by an. independent
certified public accountant.
3.
Each state chartered credit i inioi i Dai ticipating in CUSC's service center(s)
shall submit a branch application to the . , . .
* .uant to Section 7-1-708 for approval
to participate at each and every service center loc;
4
Any state chartered credit union participating in a service center(s) that may
be the subject of a supervisory or regulatory action by the Commissioner for which it is
determined that participation in the service center(s) constitutes an unsafe or unsound
practice, shall be allowed to withdraw from participation, pursuant to the submitted
Participation Agreement.

5

5.
Any state chartered credit union that is a shareholder of CUSC and may be the
subject of a supervisory or regulatory action by the Commissioner for which it is determined
that continued investment in CUSC constitutes an unsafe or unsound practice, shall be
allowed to sell its stock back to CUSC, an existing CUSC stockholder, or other person in
accordance with CUSC bylaws.
6.
Any state chartered credit union, not one of the original twelve listed in the
application, desiring to acquire CUSC stock must have the prior written approval of the
Commissioner as to the appropriateness of this investment for the credit union.
7.
CUSC and each state chartered credit union participating in the service
center(s) shall maintain adequate bond coverage.
8.
CUSC shall submit to the Department for approval all proposed changes to the
Bylaws, Management Services Agreement, Participation Agreement and Shareholder
Agreement.
9.

CUSC shall comply with all applicable interstate restrictions.

DATED this 19th day of November, 1993

G. Edward Leary
Commissioner of Financial Institutions
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argument was held on Monday, November 22, 1993. The Court entered
its Memorandum

Decision and Order on March

17, 1994.

This

Memorandum Decision and Order contains the Court's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.

A copy of the Memorandum Decision and

Order is attached hereto and incorporated herein.
Based

upon

the

foregoing

and

good

cause

appearing

therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Motion of Defendant Credit Unions and Credit

Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. to Dismiss and for Summary
Judgment is granted;
2.

The Defendant G. Edward Leary's Motion to Dismiss,

or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;
3.

The Plaintiff's Complaint against all Defendants is

dismissed with prejudice, the Plaintiff not having standing, and
its claims for injunctive relief, except as to Credit Union Service
Centers of Utah, Inc., being barred by the doctrines of laches and
estoppel;
4.

The Plaintiff's Motion

for Summary

Judgment is

denied with prejudice, the Plaintiff not having standing, and its
claims for injunctive relief, except as to Credit Unions Service
Centers of Utah, Inc., being barred by the doctrines of laches and
estoppel; and
5.

The Defendants are awarded their costs of Court.
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DATED this

day of March, I M^M
\\ i '1 III' i i m i I

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Judge
APPROVED /" «~ "ORM:

iCE H. PETTEY
torney for G. Edward Leary,
' Commissioner of Financial Institutions
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
HAND DELIVERED t* _
foregoing and attached ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT i-o:
Mr. Don B. Allen
Mr. Herschel J. Saperstrin
Mr. Kevin G. Glade
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City,
84145-0385
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 8TATE OF UTAH

THE UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

a Utah nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 930904939

vs.
AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION,
et al.,
Defendants.

The Utah Bankers Association, a trade association for the
banking industry, initiated this lawsuit against Credit Union
Service Centers, Inc. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the
Service

Center11) , a number

of

individual

Utah

credit unions

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the credit unions"), and G.
Edward

Leary,

Utah

Commissioner

of

Financial

Institutions

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Commissioner"). Neither
the State of Utah nor the Department of Financial Institutions
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Department" or "the
State") are formally parties.
In

essence,

the

Bankers

Association

seeks

statutory

interpretations (1) which would limit a credit union's operations
to

a

single

county

unless

justified

by

a

nongeographic,

associational relationship of members in different counties, and
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This requirement of a relationship or association

among members manifest
perceived

PAGE THREE

as a bond,

in a limited

field

of membership

conducive to the making

of

was

loans, the

repayment of loans and the overall success of credit unions*

See

First Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin,. 988 F.2d
1272, 1274, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
The Utah statutes reflect the concept of a limited field of
membership in both geographical and nongeographical terms.

The

nongeographical

the

relationships

which

are

authorized

for

formation of a credit union include common profession, occupation
or employer.

Section 7-9-3 (5) (a) and (c) , Utah Code Ann.

Two

specific provisions of the Utah Code allow the formation of a
credit union among members with only a geographical relationship,
Section 7-9-3(5)(b) and (d). The members must
. . . .

(b) reside
within
an
identifiable
neighborhood, community, rural district, or
county; [or]
. . . .

(d) [be] employed within a defined
business district, industrial park or shopping
center[.]
Plaintiff claims that these limitations prohibit credit unions
from having a geographical field of membership beyond a single
county unless separately and independently

justified under the

nongeographical statutory provisions. The Utah statute governing

UBA V. AMERICA FIRST
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the merger of credit unions, however, makes no reference to a
limited field of membership.

Section 7-9-39(1) allows any credit

union to merge with another credit union upon compliance with
certain procedures, none of which relate to a limited field of
membership.

Eleven of the individual defendant credit unions

include members as a result of mergers with other credit unions.
The Commissioner and his predecessors have for at least a
decade taken the position that Utah's

geographic limited field of

membership provisions do not confine a credit union's membership to
a single county.

In September, 1983, the Department articulated a

policy which would not geographically limit credit unions within
the state.

David A. Kwant, the Department's then supervisor of

credit unions, expressed this as a recommendation in a memorandum
to the then Commissioner, Elaine Weis, who immediately approved the
policy.

(The memorandum has become known as the "Kwant Memorandum"

and is hereafter referred to as such.)
The Department's expansive geographic interpretation of the
limited

field

of membership provisions

in the Utah

Code, as

reflected in the Kwant Memorandum, was specifically referenced in
Report No. 90-09 to the Utah State Legislature, A Performance Audit
of the Department of Financial Institutions, March, 1990.

This

audit and the Department's broad interpretation of the statutes
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geographically limiting a credit union's field of membership were
the

subject

of discussion

at

an April,

1990 meeting

legislature's Business and Labor Interim Committee.

of the

This meeting

was attended by Lawry Alder representing the plaintiff, the Utah
Bankers Association.

The undisputed

facts

indicate that the

Department's practice of allowing credit unions to operate in
multiple counties, even when a nongeographic relationship did not
exist between members, could not have been a surprise to the
Bankers Association, then or now.

II.

DEFERENCE TO COMMISSIONER

The credit unions and the Commissioner suggest that this court
should defer to the Department's expansive interpretation of the
Utah Code provisions on the limited field of membership for credit
unions.

The Kwant Memorandum, the genesis of the Department's

interpretation, is something less than an elaborate legal analysis.
It emphasizes credit union growth and desire for further growth
rather than legal principles.

Furthermore, the ultimate question

presented by the Bankers Association is neither factual nor a mixed
question of fact and law.

It is purely a question of law, and the

expertise of the Department does not place it in a better position
than this court to interpret the statutes enacted by the

UBA V. AMERICA FIRST
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See Savage Industries, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n.,

811 P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991); Hurley v. Industrial Comm'n.. 767
P.2d 524 (Utah 1988).

III.

STANDING

Merely because this court need not defer to the executive
branch, represented by the Department, does not necessarily mean
the court must or should resolve the ultimate issue2 raised by the
Bankers Association.

The plaintiff must first establish that it

has standing to submit the issue for judicial resolution.
plaintiff's

standing

merely

establishes

that

a

court

A

with

jurisdiction must or ought to resolve the dispute.
For an association such as the Utah Bankers Association to
have standing to bring a lawsuit such as this, its members must
have standing and the individual participation of these members
must not be necessary.
Bullock,

743 P.2d

1166,

Society of Professional Journalists v.
1175

(Utah 1987).

For purposes of

considering the outstanding motions, the court assumes that the

2

The ultimate issue is, of course, whether there exist
geographic limits on a credit union's field of membership. This
ultimate issue underlies and pervades the plaintiff's challenge to
the Service Center. As a consequence, the Court's analysis of
standing in substantial part applies to the Service Center
allegations.

UBA V. AMERICA FIRST
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Utah Bankers Association is appropriately representative of its
members and their individual participation in the litigation is
unnecessary.

As a consequence, the

court will focus on the

standing of the members.
Standing in Utah is resolved primary by determining whether
the plaintiff, or in this case the member banks of the Utah Bankers
Association, have suffered a distinct injury.

If no such distinct

injury exists, plaintiff may still have standing

if the case

presents issues of great importance which ought to be resolved, and
it is unlikely that any other plaintiff will present such issues.
National Parks and Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands, 215
Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22-23 (1993); Terracor v. Board of State Lands
& Forestry. 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986).
Proper application of these criteria requires an appreciation
of the very purposes of the doctrine of standing which acts as a
sieve, winnowing out those cases inappropriate for resolution by
the judiciary.

This sifting function is in part to prevent the

conversion of the courts into a supervisor of "the coordinate
branches of government. . . [and] an open forum for the resolution
of political and ideological disputes about the performance of
government."

Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 717

(Utah 1978).

Without the doctrine of standing, the courts would become a

UBA V. AMERICA FIRST
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grievance

center

for
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matters

more

appropriately

directed to the executive and legislative branches.

Society of

Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah
1987).

It is against this background that the court applies the

standing criteria to the facts of this case.
For the Bankers Association to qualify under the primary
standing criteria it roust demonstrate not just injury, but injury
which is "distinct", "palpable", and "particularized".

Society of

Professional Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah
1987); Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983).
allegation

of adverse

impact

is insufficient.

The mere

Jd. at 1150;

National Parks and Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands. 215
Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (1993).
The Bankers Association appears to presume injury merely
because there is some acknowledged competition generally between
banks and credit unions. While this per se approach may represent
federal

law,3

Utah

does

not

presume

distinct,

palpable

particularized injury merely because of competition.

and

The Utah

Supreme Court has stated that a disappointed prospective purchaser
of state school lands might have standing to challenge a lease to

3

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-52 (1970).
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reference

Even in the absence of this admittedly

by the Utah

Supreme

Court,

this

court

is

unwilling to blindly equate some general notion of competition and
standing.

Further analysis is desirable.

At the outset, the court notes that the approach in federal
courts is based on a case where a Comptroller of the Currency's
ruling would allow competition which did not previously exist.
Furthermore, the competitor alleging injury could demonstrate loss
of two specific accounts.

Assoc, of Data Processing Service

Organizations. Inc. v. Camp. 397 U.S. 150, 151-52 (1970).

As a

consequence, the new competitive impact on the plaintiff was patent
and particularized.
This case, however, does not present a circumstance of new
competition, nor is there any showing of specific loss of business
to credit unions.

There has always been and will always be

competition between banks and credit unions, even if the Bankers
Association were to prevail on the merits.

In a hypothetical

market where credit unions were limited to a single county unless
they

independently

justified

multicounty

membership

on

nongeographic grounds, banks would still face the following credit
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(1) county-by-county competition with credit

unions whose fields of membership were limited to a single county;
(2) multicounty competition with those credit unions whose fields
of membership were associational, not geographic; and (3) credit
unions whose geographic fields of membership were expanded by
merger.

Additionally, it would be necessary to factor in the

competition

of

federal

credit

unions

and

institutions which offer any banking service.

other

financial

Contrasting such a

hypothetical market with the existing market where credit unions
are not geographically limited4 would be, at best, an imprecise
endeavor. As a consequence, this court cannot conclude that banks
would fare better in the hypothetical market than in the existing
market.
The court is willing to assume diversion of some deposit
accounts, loans and credit card accounts from banks to credit
unions.

The court, however, is unable to assume that the cause of

such diversion is in part attributable to multi-county credit union
membership which is not the result of merger and not the result of
nongeographic justification for multi-county operations. Moreover,

4

The Commissioner, of course, retains extensive discretionary
authority to control the creation and expansion of credit unions.
See, e.g., Sections 7-1-305, -307, -311, -704, -705, -712; 7-9-11,
-37, -39, -41, Utah Code Ann.
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injunction, whether

retroactive

or

only

prospective, prohibiting multi-county credit union membership in
the

absence

of

merger

or

nongeographic,

associational

justification, would not necessarily reduce the claimed injury.
Unless such causation and effectiveness of remedy is demonstrated,
distinct, palpable and particularized injury is not manifest.
National Parks and Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands, 215
Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (1993); Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1150
(Utah 1983).
Any market analysis of competitive injury must necessarily
consider the impact of outside forces such as state and federal
taxation. Credit unions are generally exempt from such taxation.
See Section 501(c)(14)(A), Internal Revenue Code; Sections 7-9-34,
59-7-105(1) (a) and (e) , Utah Code Ann. Banks do not enjoy similar
exemptions.

The Bankers Association acknowledges the competitive

significance of these differences. Paragraph 24 of the Complaint
in this case alleges that such tax exemptions afford credit unions
a competitive advantage over banks.

When these tax consequences

are superimposed on a pure market analysis of competitive injury,
the Bankers Association's claim of injury flowing from allegedly
unlawful, multicounty credit union membership becomes sufficiently
dissipated that it fails to meet the threshold of distinct,
palpable and particularized injury.
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Associations' failure

to

demonstrate

injury

sufficient to justify standing to sue does not fully resolve the
standing

issue.

If the Association

can establish

that this

litigation presents weighty issues of sufficiently great importance
that they ought to be resolved and if it is unlikely that any other
plaintiff would venture to present such issues for resolution, the
Utah Bankers Association may well have standing to pursue this
litigation.

National Parks and Conservation Assoc, v. Board of

State Lands. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22-23 (1993).

A grant of

standing under this standard, however, is reserved for truly unique
circumstances.

Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1150-51 (Utah

1983); Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d
1166, 1170 n.4 (Utah 1987); National Parks and Conservation Assoc,
v. Board of State Lands. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 23 (Utah 1993).
None of the defendants have suggested that there is a more
appropriate plaintiff than the Bankers Association who is disposed
to raise the same issues as those presented in this litigation. As
a consequence, this court assumes that only the Bankers Association
has the incentive and resources to pursue similar litigation. The
absence

of

a more

appropriate

plaintiff,

however,

necessarily assure standing for this plaintiff.
675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983).

does

not

Jenkins v. Swan,

The issues presented roust be
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weighty and more appropriate for resolution by the judicial branch
than the executive or legislative branches.

Id, at 1150-51.

The nature of the issues which are of sufficient weight to
grant standing to a plaintiff in the absence of distinct, palpable
and particularized injury have variously been characterized by the
Utah Supreme Court as questions of "great public interest and
societal

impact",

substantial

public

importance".
County.

702

"important

public

import",

and

issues",

issues

of

questions
"great

"of

public

Id. at 1150, 1151; Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake
P.2d

451,

454

(Utah

1985);

National

Parks

and

Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 21,
23 (Utah 1993).
Some of the same factors pertinent to the injury analysis are
also

relevant

in

determining

presented in this litigation.
is

of

immense

public

the

weightiness

of

the

issues

Certainly competition in any market

importance.

Nevertheless,

judicial

micromanagement of competition in an already extensively regulated
industry, such as financial institutions, is not an item high on
any list of public interest.

As indicated above, even if the

Bankers Association were to prevail on the merits, substantial
multicounty competition with credit unions could lawfully occur as
a result of merger and otherwise.

As a consequence, the public
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in credit union intercounty

activities is de minimis. Moreover, the real competitive irritant
to

the Bankers Association

treatment

afforded

credit

appears
unions,

to
a

be

the

differing

question

patently

tax
more

appropriate for the legislative and executive branches than for the
judiciary.
The court does not doubt the genuineness of the Bankers
Association position that its members are competitively injured by
the Commissioner's alleged failure to enforce the statutory limited
field of membership provisions.

The court, however, doubts the

public significance of such alleged injury when faced with the
undisputed fact that no bank has previously raised the issue in any
court

in the decade since the Department's

adherence to the

September, 1983 Kwant Memorandum.
If the court were to grant the relief initially requested by
the

Bankers

Association,

it would

be

forced

to

oversee

the

divestiture of the multicounty operations of many credit unions, a
function foreign to the judiciary. If the court were to effectuate
plaintiff's

alternative remedy

of grandparenting

all existing

credit union operations, it would be creating a whole new industry
for the executive branch to regulate by establishing distinct
categories of credit unions with a variety of geographic
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privileges, i.e., those limited to single county operations, those
limited to operations in multiple counties but which are fewer than
all Utah

counties,

and

those whose

field

of membership

is

unlimited in Utah. Furthermore, the court would become enmeshed in
administering

the new

regulatory

framework

by

resolving

such

questions as whether a credit union would be allowed to solicit new
members or expand operations in those counties where it already had
a presence.

A regulatory morass could well be the result.

The issues raised by the Bankers Association are not of such
public moment that it should be allowed to invoke the power of this
court, which is reserved for few unique circumstances. The failure
of banks over the last decade to raise the issues they now present
would cause the judiciary to become enmeshed in regulatory matters
more appropriate for the executive branch.

Finally, the issues of

competition within the financial institution industry appear to be
affected more by tax laws than by the multicounty operations of
credit

unions.

Promulgation

of tax

laws

is quite

obviously

inherent in the legislative branch. As a consequence, even if the
issues raised by the Bankers Association were of significant public
importance,

they

are more

appropriate

for

resolution

by

the

legislative and executive branches and standing before the courts
should be denied.

Id.
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LACHES AND ESTOPPEL

Even if the Bankers Association had standing to pursue this
litigation, the doctrines of laches and estoppel would apply and
preclude injunctive relief as a result of the failure of any bank
or the Bankers Association to present these issues to any court in
the decade since the promulgation of the Kwant Memorandum.5

The

Bankers Association's suggestion of only a prospective remedy,
overlooking alleged past transgressions of a single county rule,
would actually create prejudice to those credit unions which quite
fortuitously

lagged, behind

their

institutional

colleagues

in

developing multicounty membership and operations.

CONCLUSION
The doctrine of standing might disparagingly be perceived as
a mere vehicle

for a court

to duck tough

issues.

In this

particular case, however, the doctrine appropriately discharges its
gatekeeping function which enables courts to deflect issues which
are more appropriately resolved by another branch of government.
The underlying and real dispute in this case is the disparate tax
treatment of banks and credit unions which is a matter for the

5

The laches and estoppel defenses are not necessarily
applicable to plaintiff's claims concerning the Service Center.
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As a consequence, the entirety of this litigation

involving differences between credit unions and banks is more
appropriately resolved by the executive or legislative branches,
not the judiciary.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions for summary
judgment are granted. Defendants are to submit an appropriate form
of

judgment

pursuant

to

Rule

4-504,

Code

Administration.
Dated this

/7

day of March, 1994.

MICHAEI/RC MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

of

Judicial
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